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This Article examines Justice Ginsburg's overlookedfederalismjurisprudence and
concludes that it almost perfectly complements President Bill Clinton's New
Democratic centrism, especially his pro-state federalism agenda. The Article
concludes that their nuanced, "centrist" approach to federalism has two
characteristics. First, they value the states 'governing autonomy and show respectfor
the state agents that realize that autonomy. Second, they credit the states as
intersubjective actors engaged in the pursuit of their interests, albeit in political
processes usually carried out at the federal level.
INTRODUCTION
Politics' and pathology 2 have converged to heighten speculation that Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg's tenure on the Supreme Court is nearing its end . Even if the
t Copyright © 2010 Russell A. Miller.
* Associate Professor, Washington & Lee University School of Law; Senior Fulbright
Research Fellow (Germany) 2009/2010; B.A., Washington State University; J.D./M.A., Duke
University; LL.M., Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt, Germany. I first tested this
thesis on a panel on President Clinton's judicial appointments at the Hofstra University Cultural
Center's 1 th Presidential Conference---"William Jefferson Clinton: The 'New Democrat' From
Hope"-November 10-12, 2005. 1 am indebted to all of the participants at the conference, and
on my panel in particular, for feedback and comments. Michael Greve provided a valuable,
constructive reaction to an earlier draft of the Article. I am grateful for the insight and comments
of co-panelists at the Spring 2009 New England Law School symposium honoring Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg. I benefitted immensely in this effort from conversations with my Washington
& Lee University colleagues Mark Rush and Tyler Dickovick. Finally, for help on this project I
am grateful to research assistants at both the University of Idaho College of Law and the
Washington & Lee University Law School, including Jonas Callis (Washington & Lee
University Law School 2009), Megan Mooney (University of Idaho College of Law 2007), and
Jamilla Holmes (University of Idaho College of Law 2007).
1. Democrat Barack Obama's election to the presidency sparked widespread speculation
that the Court's long-serving Democratic appointees and liberal-voting Republican appointees
will be considering retirement. Justice Ginsburg is regularly mentioned in connection with such
speculation. See, e.g., David G. Savage, Obama and the Supreme Court, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 17,
2008, at A12 [hereinafter Savage, Obama and the Court]; Justin Jouvenal, Ten Picks for
Obama's Supreme Court, SALON.COM, Nov. 19, 2008, http://www.salon.com/news/feature/
2008/11/19/supremecourt/. However, it was Justice David Souter's retirement that gave
President Obama his first Supreme Court appointment. See Peter Baker & Jeff Zeleny, Souter's
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imminence of her retirement is greatly exaggerated,4 the time to reflect on Justice
Ginsburg's lasting contribution to American constitutional law has arrived.
Justice Ginsburg is best known for her long campaign to promote gender equality.5
Her successful advocacy on that issue before the Supreme Court throughout the 1970s
led President Clinton to conclude, when announcing her nomination to fill Justice
Byron White's vacated seat on the high court, that "she is to the women's movement
Exit to Give Obama First Opening, N.Y. TIMES.COM, May 1, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/05/02/us/ 02souter.html?_r=1 &ref=weekinreview. President Obama nominated then-Judge
Sonia Sotomayor to replace Justice Souter, and she was confirmed by the Senate in August 2009
to become only the third female Supreme Court justice. See Adam Liptak, The Newest Justice
Takes Her Seat, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2009, at Al; Charlie Savage, Sotomayor Confirmed by
Senate, 68-31, N.Y. TIMES.COM, Aug. 6,2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/07/us/politics
/07confirm.html?hp. Speculation about imminent retirements at the Supreme Court now seems
to be focused on Justice John Paul Stevens. See Adam Liptak, A Justice Slows His Hiring, and
Some WonderAbout His Future, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2009, at A14 [hereinafter Liptak, Justice
Slows Hiring].
2. In February 2009, Justice Ginsburg received treatment for pancreatic cancer. See Carrie
Johnson, Ginsburg's Illness Puts Focus on Choices Ahead for Obama, WASH. POST, Feb. 7,
2009, at A2; Carrie Johnson & Rob Stein, Justice's Surgeons Find Malignant Tumor; Ginsburg
Goes Home After Procedure to Remove Spleen, Growth in Pancreas, WASH. POST, Feb. 14,
2009, at A4; Adam Liptak, Justice Ginsburg Undergoes Surgery for Pancreatic Cancer, Court
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2009, at A12. Justice Ginsburg was again hospitalized in October
2009 after she "became drowsy and fell from her seat aboard an airplane." See Justice is
Hospitalized, N.Y. TIMES.COM, Oct. 15, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/16/us/16brfs-
JUSTICEISHOS_ BRF.html?scp= I2&sq=ginsburg&st=cse.
3. Kentucky Senator Jim Bunning created an embarrassing sensation when he suggested
this in a speech in Hardin County, Kentucky. Bunning reportedly said that Ginsburg has "bad
cancer. The kind you don't get better from.... Even though she was operated on, usually, nine
months is the longest that anybody would live." Joe Biesk, Sen. Bunning Apologizes for
Ginsburg Cancer Remark, ABCNEWS.coM, Feb. 23, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/
wireStoryid=6938796 (internal quotation marks omitted).
4. Justice Ginsburg made a lively return to the Court, participating in its first session of the
new year. See Jesse J. Holland, Ginsburg in Court 18 Days After Cancer Surgery,
ABCNews.com, Feb. 23, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=6938312; Adam
Liptak, On Return to Court, Ginsburg is Quick to Question, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2009, at A12;
see also Liptak, Justice Slows Hiring, supra note 1 (noting that speculation over the Court's
next retirement now focuses on Justice Stevens: "But Justice Ginsburg, who is 76, did not miss a
day on the bench, has maintained an active public schedule and has said she intends to continue
to serve for some time").
5. See CASS R. SUNSTEN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING CouRTS ARE
WRONG FOR AMERICA 107 (2006) ("Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg is one of the leading advocates
for women's equality in the history of American law."); Karen O'Connor & Barbara Palmer,
The Clinton Clones: Ginsburg, Breyer, and the Clinton Legacy, 84 JUDICATURE 262,265 (2001)
("Ginsburg's personal encounters with sex discrimination eventually led her to use her legal
talents to found the Women's Rights Project while a professor at Rutgers, and then the
Women's Rights Project (WRP) of the ACLU while she was a professor at Columbia. As the
Director of the WRP, she not only fashioned a litigation strategy designed to convince the Court
to elevate sex to a suspect classification, she argued six sex-discrimination cases before the
Supreme Court and orally argued an additional case as amicus. She won five of these cases.
Consequently, when she was nominated, her positions on women's rights and abortion were
well known.").
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what former Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall was to the movement for the
rights of African-Americans."6 This prominent facet of Justice Ginsburg's
jurisprudence reached its zenith when she authored the majority opinion in the Court's
landmark decision United States v. Virginia,7 which very nearly puts gender equality
on the same strictly protected constitutional footing as racial equality.8 This aspect of
Justice Ginsburg's jurisprudence attracts considerable attention, 9 and it seems likely
that it will continue to preoccupy constitutional scholars and Court observers.'0
I have chosen, instead, to examine Justice Ginsburg's federalism jurisprudence,
which suggests that she also might be remembered for complementing the centrist
political agenda of the President who nominated her. Justice Ginsburg's progressive
gender-equality jurisprudence poses a stark challenge to this claim, a challenge made
thornier by the high value President Clinton clearly put on Justice Ginsburg's
6. Remarks Announcing the Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Be a Supreme Court
Associate Justice, 1 PUB. PAPERS 842, 843 (June 14, 1993). Michael James Confusione
criticized the comparison, pointing out that Marshall embraced remedial racial legislation while
Ginsburg has expressed skepticism toward gender-based preferences. Michael James
Confusione, Note, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Thurgood Marshall: A Misleading
Comparison, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 887, 887-98 (1995).
7. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
In United States v. Virginia, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the
exclusion of women by the Virginia Military Institute (VMI). Virginia, in response
to an order from the Unites States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, had
created the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership at Mary Baldwin College.
The Court found this insufficient to excuse VMI's gender discrimination; women
still were denied an opportunity available only for men.
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 9.4.1, at 755 (3d ed.
2006) (citations omitted).
8. In her majority opinion for the Court, holding the exclusion of women from the
Virginia Military Institute (VMI) unconstitutional, Justice Ginsburg applied intermediate
scrutiny but said that "[p]arties who seek to defend gender-based government action must
demonstrate an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for that action. . . . The burden of
justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the State." Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531-33; see
also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, § 9.4.1, at 755.
9. Of the fifty-eight law review articles "on or About Ginsburg" that Sarah Valentine
catalogued in an annotated bibliography of Justice Ginsburg, twenty-five are focused on her
gender-equality jurisprudence or pursue lines of inquiry directly linked to women's issues.
Sarah E. Valentine, Ruth Bader Ginsburg: An Annotated Bibliography, 7 N.Y. CITY L. REV.
391, 439-51 (2004). For notable exceptions to this trend, see Samuel Bagenstos, Justice
Ginsburg and the Judicial Role in Expanding "We the People ": The Disability Rights Cases,
104 COLUM. L. REv. 49 (2004); David Cowan Bayne, Insider Trading: The Misappropriation
Theory Ignored: Ginsburg's O'Hagan, 53 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1 (1998); Edward A. Fallone,
Neither Liberal Nor Laissez Faire: A Prediction of Justice Ginsburg's Approach to Business
Law Issues, 1993 COLum. Bus. L. REv. 279; Sidney Harring & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier,
Scrupulous in Applying the Law: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Capital Punishment, 7 N.Y.
CITY L. REv. 241 (2004). See also David von Drehle, Redefining Fair with a Simple Careful
Assault, WASH. POST, July 19, 1993, at Al.
10. See generally HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS 307 (5th ed.
2008).
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commitment to the issue." But the usual emphasis given to gender equality in
commentary on Justice Ginsburg's work highlights the progressive profiles of the
Justice and her President, fueling the persistent but mistaken view that both are
orthodox liberals. They are not.12 This Article advances this claim through a study of
the nexus between President Clinton's pro-state federalism policies and Justice
Ginsburg's pro-state federalism jurisprudence. As regards federalism, it seems that
President Clinton got exactly what he wanted from his first nomination to the Supreme
Court: a judicially modest centrist that contributed to his attempt to refashion the
Democrats as a party embracing "ideas and values that [are] both liberal and
conservative."'
3
I begin, in Part I, by arguing that President Clinton's nomination of Justice
Ginsburg was not merely a sop to the Democratic Party's liberal base, but was, instead,
representative of his centrist political vision. I also explain why Justice Ginsburg's
federalism jurisprudence is especially meaningful support for that argument. As I use it
here and throughout the Article, the term "centrist" is meant to capture President
Clinton's political theory known as the "third way."'14 Then-Governor Clinton
11. Considering his Rose Garden remarks when announcing her nomination, President
Clinton must have been pleased to have appointed the Justice who has taken the lead in
expanding constitutional gender-equality protections. Justice Ginsburg's nomination itself,
however, serves as proof of President Clinton's dedication to the classically liberal aim of
promoting general equality. In nominating then-Judge Ginsburg to the Court, he used the first
Democratic nomination to the Supreme Court in twenty-six years to seat only the second female
justice. President Clinton can also be credited with diversifying the federal judiciary. In his
evaluation of President Clinton's first-term appointments, Carl Tobias remarked:
During President Clinton's initial term in office, he apparently kept his promises
relating to judicial appointments, and his administration achieved the selection
goals that it had set. President Clinton appointed 202 judges to the federal bench;
62 (31%) of whom are women and 58 (29%) of whom are minorities. This judicial
selection record is unprecedented. It contrasts sharply with the numbers of women
and minorities chosen by the Reagan, Bush, and Carter Administrations. For
instance, President Clinton named more women to the bench in his first three years
as Chief Executive than President Bush appointed in one term and than President
Reagan named in eight years.
Carl Tobias, Choosing Federal Judges in the Second Clinton Administration, 24 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 741, 745 (1997) (citations omitted).
12. "If Byron White wasn't a typical Democrat, neither was Bill Clinton." JEFFREY TOOBIN,
THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 62 (2007). "Ginsburg was hardly
a radical," and she had won "great suspicion" from the left with her scholarly criticism of Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). TOOBIN supra, at 70.
13. BILL CLINTON, MY LIFE 366 (2004). President Clinton's centrism extended to pro-state
federalism policies that constituted a centerpiece of his "New Democratic" presidency. See
William A. Galston & Geoffrey L. Tibbetts, Reinventing Federalism: The Clinton/Gore
Program for a New Partnership Among the Federal, State, Local, and Tribal Governments,
PuBuus: J. FEDERALISM, Summer 1994, at 23. President Clinton's nomination of Ruth Bader
Ginsburg was one of his efforts to shape a "new middle" in American politics. See infra note 23
and accompanying text.
14. See FLAvIO ROMANO, CLNTON AND BLAIR: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE THIRD WAY
(2006); ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE THIRD WAY AND ITS CRrTCS (2000); see also Turning Ideas
Into Action, NEW DEMOCRAT, May 1, 1999, available at http://www.dlc.org/print.
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explained this vision in his keynote address at the 1991 Cleveland Democratic
Leadership Council (DLC) Convention 15 (viewed as the event that certified his
presidential bid as legitimate). 16 "We have got to have a message that touches
everybody," Clinton said, "[a message] that makes sense to everybody, that goes
beyond the stale orthodoxies of left and right ... Ginsburg expressed similar
sentiments during the Senate confirmation hearing on her Supreme Court nomination
when she explained that "[m]y approach, I believe, is neither liberal nor
conservative."' 8 I establish the centrist character of President Clinton's and Justice
Ginsburg's federalism in Part II, where I also demonstrate the intersection of their
approaches with a close examination of their positions on the preemption doctrine.
This effort reveals that their distinctly "centrist" approach to federalism rejects the
Democrat's long-standing preference for national authority in the state-federal balance
while refising to simply adopt the customary Republican view that the states and the
federal government are mutually exclusive dual sovereigns. They achieve this through
a federalism vision that has two characteristics. First, they give force to a variation on
the traditionally Republican dual-sovereignty approach to federalism by showing
respect for the states' governing autonomy and the state agents empowered to realize
that autonomy. Second, they credit Democratic preferences for national policy and
standards by viewing the states as intersubj ective actors engaged in the pursuit of their
interests in the national political process.
cfn?contentid=1247 (excerpts from the transcript of a forum hosted by President Bill Clinton
that served as "a public colloquy on the international Third Way political movement"); Reginald
Dale, Thinking Ahead/ Commentary: What the "Third Way" Is Really About, N.Y. TIMES.COM,
Apr. 4, 2000, http://nytimes.com/2000/04/O4/business/worldbusiness/O4iht-think.2.t.html
("Hilary Clinton once reportedly portrayed the Third Way as 'a unified field theory of life' that
will 'marry conservatism and liberalism, capitalism and statism, and tie together practically
everything: the way we are, the way we were, the faults of man and the word of God, the end of
communism and the beginning of the new millennium."'); John B. Judis, Is the Third Way
Finished?, AM. PROSPECT, June 30, 2002, available at http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles
?article=is the third-way finished.
15. Governor Bill Clinton, Keynote Address at the Democratic Leadership Council's
Cleveland Convention (May 6, 1991).
16. See id.; Gwen Ifill, Democratic Group Argues Over Goals, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1991, at
A21; Gwen Ifill, The 1992 Campaign: Democrats; Centrist Council Exults in Success of a
Member, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1992, at 29; Robin Toner, Identity Becomes Central to Debate as
Democrats Prepare for 1992 Race, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1991, at 28; Robin Toner, Political
Memo; Democrats Stick Toes in Waters of 1992 Race, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1991, at A 13; see
also CHARLES 0. JONES, PASSAGES TO THE PRESIDENCY: FROM CAMPAIGNING TO GOVERNING 44
(1998) ("[Clinton] delivered a well-received speech in Cleveland, May 6, 1991, that was bound
to stir talk of his candidacy in 1992 .... "); DAVID MARANISS, FIRST IN His CLASS 459 (1995)
("The buzz in Washington among journalists and political opinion makers was that the
Cleveland speech had established Clinton as a serious national figure, one who seemed to have a
clear idea of what he wanted to do as president."); DAVID MARANiSs & ELLEN NAKASHIMA, THE
PRINCE OF TENNESSEE 263-65 (2000) ("Bill Clinton used Cleveland as the departure station for
his improbable ride to the White House.").
17. Clinton, supra note 15.
18. Neil Lewis, Ginsburg Promises Judicial Restraint if She Joins Court, N.Y. TIMES, July
21, 1993, at Al.
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I. A NEW DEMOCRATIC NOMINEE AND CENTRIST FEDERALISM
In at least one respect, some are now willing to argue that President George W.
Bush got the better of his predecessor in the White House. Like President Bill Clinton
before him, George W. Bush had the opportunity to nominate two Justices to the
Supreme Court.19 Some commentators believe that President Bush more effectively
placed his stamp on the Court with his nomination of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito than President Clinton succeeded in doing with his nominations of Justice
Ginsburg and Justice Breyer.20 Nominating the Chief Justice and the replacement for
the swing-voting Justice O'Connor clearly counts toward President Bush's advantage
in the comparison. But the argument also advances the view that, where President Bush
made ideological nominations that will shift the Court in the direction of his
conservative agenda,21 President Clinton's nominations lack the corresponding liberal
ideological gravitas.
22
This critique of President Clinton's nominations depends on the persistent but
mistaken view that he was an orthodox liberal, a view that is contradicted by his claims
and record. Rather, President Clinton's nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg was one of
his many efforts to shape a "third way" in American politics. As Christopher Smith and
Kimberly Beuger explained in their survey of presidential nominations to the Supreme
Court, "President Clinton's primary purpose for nominating Justice Ginsburg was 'his
need for a nominee who was risk-free, one who would not only sail smoothly through
19. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Alito Sworn in as Justice After Senate Gives Approval, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2006, at A2 1; Sheryl Gay Tolberg & Elisabeth Bumiller, Democrats Split-Focus
Now on 2ndPick, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2005, at Al; see also ABRAHAM, supra note 10, at 315-
24;TOOBn, supra note 12, at 257-317; Joan Biskupic, The Alito/O'Connor Switch, 35 PEPP. L.
REv. 495 (2008); Laura Krugman Ray, The Style of a Skeptic: The Opinions of Chief Justice
Roberts, 83 IND. L.J. 997 (2008); Lori A. Ringhand, The Roberts Court: Year 1, 73 TENN. L.
REv. 607 (2006); Mark Tushnet, The First (and Last?) Term of the Roberts Court, 42 TULSA L.
REv. 495 (2008).
20. See Savage, Obama and the Court, supra note 1 ("President Clinton... steered away
from strong liberals, instead choosing veteran appeals court judges with moderate to liberal
records."); Jouvenal, supra note I ("Recent history suggests the paths Obama might follow.
President George W. Bush appointed two solidly conservative justices in John Roberts and
Samuel A. Alito, which excited his base. President Clinton took a different tack: He appointed
two moderate liberals-Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer .... ").
21. See Jouvenal, supra note 1; see also SUNSTEtN, supra note 5, at 31 ("Under President
Bush, many Republicans accused the Democrats of 'playing politics' with the judiciary. They
were right; the ideological beliefs of the Bush appointees were sometimes the source of the
difficulty. But the accusation neglects something important. Some appointees had controversial
and even radical views about the Constitution, and they were chosen for exactly that reason.");
Jeffrey Rosen, The Unregulated Offensive, N.Y. TIMES, April 17, 2005, § 6 (Magazine), at 42.
22. Carl Tobias noted that observers on the left "have criticized [President Clinton] for
failing to appoint attorneys whom they perceived to be more politically partisan, particularly as
a counterbalance to the express intent of Presidents Reagan and [George H.W.] Bush to make
the courts more conservative by naming lawyers with explicit doctrinaire views." Carl Tobias,
President Clinton and the Federal Judiciary, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 121, 122 (1996); Tobias,
supra note 11, at 751; see also Savage, Obama and the Court, supra note 1.
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the Senate but also might ... reconfirm his move to the political center . ,,,23
President Clinton failed to nominate dogmatic liberals to the Supreme Court because it
was not his intention to entrench a dogmatically liberal political agenda, even on the
Court.
Lee Epstein and Jeffrey Segal have remarked that "presidents are notorious whiners
about their judicial appointees. 24 This, as Henry Abraham explained, occurs because
there is "a considerable element of unpredictability in the judicial appointing
process."25 But President Clinton has precious little reason to complain.26 His judicial
nominations were consistent with his centrist "New Democratic" ideology, particularly
because their judicial philosophies revealed a marked shift to the center.27 Both The
New York Times and The Washington Post heralded Ginsburg's nomination as a
significant nod to centrism. Neil Lewis, writing for the Times, described then-Judge
Ginsburg's work on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit as "resolutely centrist" and "decidedly moderate," and he noted that Ginsburg
voted "more consistently with her Republican-appointed colleagues than with her
fellow Democratic-appointed colleagues., 29 Joan Biskupic concluded for The
Washington Post that "[i]f Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg becomes a Supreme Court
justice, the court will belong to the center., 30 A broad vista, taking in more than her
23. Mei-Fei Kuo & Kai Wang, When Is an Innovation in Order?: Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and Stare Decisis, 20 U. HAw. L. REV. 835, 862 (1998) (quoting Christopher E. Smith
& Kimberly A. Beuger, Clouds in the Crystal Ball: Presidential Expectations and the
Unpredictable Behavior of Supreme Court Appointees, 27 AKRON L. REV. 115, 135-36 (1993))
(emphasis added). However progressive Justice Ginsburg's gender-equality jurisprudence was
during her tenure with the ACLU's Women's Rights Project, by the time she was appointed to
the bench she was considered conservative by the then-current leaders of the woman's
movement. As Patricia Cain remarked: "[litigators, like Ruth Bader Ginsburg, have been
charged as being short-sighted because they adopted an assimilationist theory of equality that
would benefit women only if they acted like men." Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of
Equality, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS 237, 238 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993)
(citing Debra Ratterman, Liberating Feminist Jurisprudence, OFF OUR BACKS, Jan. 1990, at 12).
24. LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
APPOINTMENTS 119 (2005).
25. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 79 (7th ed. 1998).
26. Does any president have reason to complain? As Epstein and Segal note, Laurence
Tribe has described the "'myth of the surprised president.' By this he means that 'in areas of
particular and known concern to a President, Justices have been loyal to the ideals and
perspectives of the men who have nominated them."' EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 24, at 120
(quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THis HONORABLE COURT: How THE CHOICE OF SUPREME
COURT JUSTICES SHAPES OUR HISTORY 50 (1985)).
27. Nancy Scherer, Who Drives the Ideological Makeup of the Lower Federal Courts in a
Divided Government?, 35 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 191, 211 (2001).
28. See Joan Biskupic, Judge Ruth Ginsburg Named to High Court; Nominee's Philosophy
Seen Strengthening the Center, WASH. POST, June 15, 1993, at Al; Neil A. Lewis, Balanced
Jurist at Home in the Middle, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1993, at 20.
29. Lewis, supra note 28 (noting that Ginsburg voted with the infamously conservative
Judge Bork eighty-five percent of the time and with the well-known liberal Judge Wald only
thirty-eight percent of the time).
30. Biskupic, supra note 28 ("In the judicial context, a 'liberal' approach connotes a
willingness to more broadly read constitutional guarantees beyond the clear mandates of elected
2010]
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gender-equality jurisprudence, confirms Justice Ginsburg's secure place in the middle
of the Supreme Court where her jurisprudence has been reflective of President
Clinton's centrist, New Democratic political vision. Epstein and Segal concluded that
Justice Ginsburg was closely aligned with President Clinton's ideology at the time of
her nomination (albeit slightly more conservative); 31 that her voting record on the
Supreme Court nearly perfectly aligns with the positions she would have been expected
to take based on her political ideology; 32 and that her voting record on the Supreme
Court is even more closely aligned with President Clinton's ideology (proving slightly
more conservative) than Justice Scalia's is or Chief Justice Rehnquist's was with
President Reagan's ideology (both also proving more conservative).33 In his intimate
survey of nearly two decades in the life of the Supreme Court, Jeffrey Toobin
concluded that "more than any recent president since Johnson, Clinton was able to use
his appointments to shape the Court in line with his own views." 34 This is true, even
while President Clinton's nominations proved to be unpopular with his liberal
Democratic base,35 because Justice Ginsburg's and later then-Judge Stephen Breyer's
nominations "reflected, with great precision, the moderate-to-liberal politics of the
president. ,
36
First and foremost, Justice Ginsburg's centrism is demonstrated by her incontestable
judicial modesty. 37 She also has taken moderate positions on a number of substantive
lawmakers. A judicial 'conservative,' conversely, believes the courts should not involve
themselves in social problems that are traditionally the province of legislators.... Neither tag
captures Ginsburg.").
31. Actually, Justice Ginsburg plots as slightly more conservative than President Clinton.
EPsTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 24, at 122 fig.5.1.
32. Of all Justices appointed, Warren through Breyer, Justices Powell, Scalia, and Ginsburg
have most perfectly fulfilled ideological expectations. Id. at 125 fig.5.2.
33. Id. at 131 fig.5.4.
34. TOOBIN, supra note 12, at 73. Toobin's survey encompasses George W. Bush's
appointments of Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justice Samuel Alito. Thus, this claim
represents his view that President Clinton bested his successor in regard to their respective
impact on the Court.
35. Id., at 70 (noting skepticism for Ginsburg "among the more liberal members of the
administration" because she was viewed as a "moderate-to-conservative judge ... often...
aligned with one-time colleagues Robert Bork and Antonin Scalia").
36. Id. at 73.
37. Cass Sunstein concluded that Ginsburg "is a (somewhat) liberal minimalist. She likes to
decide cases, rather than set out broad principles; and she is reluctant to embrace large-scale
generalities about the foundations of the law." SuNsTEIN, supra note 5, at 29.
In her scholarship, Justice Ginsburg has clearly articulated a commitment to judicial
restraint. She urges respect for precedent and prefers the legislature as the vehicle for significant
change. Writing the year before her appointment to the Supreme Court, Justice Ginsburg
explained:
[J]udges play an interdependent part in our democracy. They do not alone shape
legal doctrine but, ...they participate in a dialogue with other organs of
government, and with the people as well. "[J]udges do and must legislate," Justice
Homes "recognized without hesitation," but "they can do so," he cautioned, "only
interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions." Measured
motions seem to me right, in the main, for constitutional as well as common law
adjudication. Doctrinal limbs too swiftly shaped, experience teaches, may prove
unstable.
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issues. For my purposes, however, it is Justice Ginsburg's commitment to state
autonomy that most dramatically belies the claims of conservative commentators and
empirical scholars who view her as one of the Court's most consistently liberal and
activist justices. Vilified by the right almost from the beginning of her tenure on the
Court, Ginsburg was implicated as an "activist" in Senator Bob Dole's attempt to make
the judiciary an issue in the 1996 presidential campaign. President Clinton's reelection,
Dole cautioned, would "lock in liberal judicial activism for the next generation. ' ' 4
Jason Eric Sharp noted that "one conservative public interest group [asserted] that
Clinton's judicial legacy would be an 'out of control' judiciary prone to judicial
activism."' The National Review regularly criticizes what it views as Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1185, 1198 (1992)
(quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205,221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting)) [hereinafter
Ginsburg, Judicial Voice]. This approach is most dramatically revealed in her scholarly criticism
of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Justice Ginsburg argued that the Court "ventured too far
in the change it ordered" in Roe. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and
Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 381-85 (1985) [hereinafter
Ginsburg, Thoughts]. She would have preferred that the reproductive-rights agenda had been
advanced by the political process and in the majoritarian institutions, with the courts "point[ing]
out, but not completely reshap[ing], flaws or unfairness in the majority's rules of law."
Confusione, supra note 6, at 899; see Laura Krugman Ray, Justice Ginsburg and the Middle
Way, 68 BROOK. L. REv. 629 (2003).
38. Neil Lewis noted that, during her tenure on the D.C. Circuit, then-Judge Ginsburg was
"largely favorable to law enforcement on criminal matters." Lewis, supra note 28. Ginsburg has
maintained a largely progovernment position in criminal cases on the Supreme Court. See
THOMAS R. HENSLEY, CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH & JOYCE A. BAUGH, THE CHANGING SUPREME
COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 81 (1997); Craig Bradley, The Middle Class
Fourth Amendment, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 1123 (2003); Harring & Kirchmeier, supra note 9, at
243-44; Christopher E. Smith, Criminal Justice and the 1998-99 United States Supreme Court
Term, 9 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 23 (1999). For this point Jeffley Toobin cited former Senate
Judiciary Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch's belief that, with a view toward Ginsburg's
moderate record on the D.C. Circuit, "she would have no problem in the Senate." TOOBIN, supra
note 12, at 71. Her nomination was confirmed by a vote of ninety-six to three. HENSLEY ET AL.,
supra, at 81.
39. It is possible to view Ginsburg's critical engagement with Roe as expressing sympathy
for the states' governing autonomy and their function as policy innovators, views that will prove
to be central to my characterization of Ginsburg as a pro-state centrist on federalism. In her
North Carolina Law Review article, Ginsburg drew favorable attention to the fact that, prior to
Roe, the states had embarked on a "distinct trend . . . 'toward liberalization of abortion
statutes[,]' an exercise of state-governing autonomy that the Court disrupted with its
intervention in Roe. Ginsburg, Thoughts, supra note 37, at 379-80 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at
140); see Biskupic, supra note 28.
40. William G. Ross, The Role of Judicial Issues in Presidential Campaigns, 42 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 391,456 (2002) (quoting Harvey Berkman & Claudia MacLachlan, Don 'tJudge
a Book... Clinton's Picks-Not So Liberal: More Judges Are Minorities, Women, but Ike 'd
Like Them, NAT'L REv., Oct. 21, 1996, at Al); see also Stephan 0. Kline, The Topsy-Turvy
World of Judicial Confirmations in the Era of Hatch and Lott, 103 DICK. L. REv. 247, 258
(1999) ("'If we give President Clinton the opportunity to make just one more appointment to the
Supreme Court, we could end up with the most liberal court since the Warren Court of the
sixties."' (quoting Sen. Robert Dole)).
41. Jason Eric Sharp, Constitutional Law-Separation of Powers-Restoring the
Constitutional Formula to the Federal Judicial Appointment Process: Taking the Vice out of
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Ginsburg's liberal Democratic agenda.42 In a recent editorial, Edward Whelan argued
that Ginsburg "can't separate judging from politics," and he concluded that her
"decisionmaking routinely indulges and entrenches her own political preferences.
' 43
Whelan documented those "political preferences" in a 2005 editorial in which he
decried as a "double standard" what he felt to be the lack of scrutiny applied by the
Senate to then-Judge Ginsburg's Supreme Court nomination and to the demanding
review given by the Senate to then-Judge John Roberts' nomination to become Chief
Justice. Whelan fumed that the Senate had misplaced its efforts because Roberts "is by
any measure far more 'mainstream' than Ginsburg," who was an "established
extremist." 4
Empirical scholars reach similar conclusions about Justice Ginsburg, although their
tone is less shrill. In their groundbreaking "attitudinal" examination of the decision-
making behavior of the Court's justices, Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth call Justice
Ginsburg and Justice Stevens the Court's "two most liberal justices."' 5 Lori Ringhand
and the teams led by Richard Wilkins and Andrew Martin give the same
characterization to Justice Ginsburg's record on the Court.46
But, with respect to "Our Federalism, ' 47 there is compelling evidence of President
Clinton's and Justice Ginsburg's centrism. And centrism with respect to federalism
"Advice and Consent, " 26 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 747, 766 (2004) (quoting John
Anthony Maltese, Confirmation Gridlock: The Federal Judicial Appointments Process Under
Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1, 15 (2003)).
42. See, e.g., Matthew J. Franck, Bench Memos; Ideology and Balance, NAT'L REV.
ONLINE, Nov. 11, 2005, http://search.nationalreview.com/ (search "Ideology and Balance" in
section "Bench Memos" and author "Franck"); Ed Whelan, Empirical Data, NAT'L REV.
ONLINE, June 21, 2007, http://search.nationalreview.com/ (search "Empirical Data" in section
"Bench Memos" and author "Whelan"); Ed Whelan, Ginsburg's Voice, NAT'L REV. ONLINE,
May 31, 2007, http://search.nationalreview.com/ (search "Ginsburg's Voice" in section "Bench
Memos" and author "Whelan," using start and end date of "05/31/2007"); Ed Whelan, More on
Justice Ginsburg's Political Activism, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Oct. 25, 2007, http://
search.nationalreview.com/ (search "More on Justice Ginsburg's Political Activism" in section
"Bench Memos" and author "Whelan," using state and end date of "10/25/2007").
43. Ed Whelan, Justice Ginsburg's PoliticalActivism, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, May 30,2007,
http://search.nationalreview.com/ (search "Justice Ginsburg's Political Activism" in section
"Bench Memos" and author "Whelan," using start and end date of "05/30/2007").
44. Edward Whelan, The Ginsburg Record and Standard, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, July 26,
2005, http://search.nationalreview.com/ (search "The Ginsburg Record and Standard" in section
"NRO Articles" and author "Whelan," using start and end date of "07/26/2005").
45. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL REVISITED 172 (2002).
46. See Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Lee Epstein, The Median Justice on the
United States Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1275 (2005); Lori A. Ringhand, Judicial
Activism: An Empirical Examination of Voting Behavior on the Rehnquist Natural Court, 24
CONST. COMMENT. 43 (2007); Richard G. Wilkins, Scott Worthington, Peter J. Jenkins &
Elisabeth Liljenquist, Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 2006 Term, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
51 (2008).
47. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
This underlying reason for restraining courts of equity from interfering with
criminal prosecutions is reinforced by an even more vital consideration, the notion
of 'comity,' that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact
that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a
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counts for something in an assessment of their ideological profile. After all, federalism
has been called the "heart of American constitutionalism" and thus serves as a
supremely useful bellwether of constitutional values.48 Federalism is of particular
significance in a study of President Clinton and Justice Ginsburg because their centrist
approach staked a claim to sacred conservative territory regarding state autonomy
while spuming the nationalist credo of the "Great Society" Democrats on the left.
49
The data confirms that Justice Ginsburg forcefully has defended a secure role for the
states in our federal system,50 occupying a position far removed from the Democrat's
long-standing preference for national authority in the state-federal balance. This is so,
even though Justice Ginsburg has not simply adopted the customary Republican view
that the states and the federal government are mutually exclusive dual sovereigns. 51
continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States
and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their
separate ways. This, perhaps for lack of a better and clearer way to describe it, is
referred to by many as 'Our Federalism' .... The concept does not mean blind
deference to "States' Rights" any more than it means centralization of control
over every important issue in our National Government and its courts.... What
the concept does represent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate
interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the National
Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and
federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere
with the legitimate activities of the States.
Id.
48. H. Jefferson Powell, The Principles of'98: An Essay in Historical Retrieval, 80 VA. L.
REv. 689, 690 (1994).
49. See Michael J. Klarman, What's So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw. U. L. REV.
145, 191 n.250 (1998) ("In the political context of the 1990s, . . . political liberals tend to
support national power (probably because of the national government's greater redistributive
capacities), while conservatives praise federalism.").
50. Wilkins et al., supra note 46, at 61, 82. This wrinkle in the superficial narrative that
casually labels Ginsburg a "liberal justice" exposes the general difficulty of relying on empirical
analyses to characterize justices' jurisprudence. See Caprice L. Roberts, In Search of Judicial
Activism: Dangers in Quantifying the Qualitative, 74 TENN. L. REv. 567 (2007); Ernest A.
Young, Just Blowing Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, and the Federalist Revival After Gonzales v.
Raich, 2005 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 9-16 (2005) [hereinafter Young, Just Blowing Smoke?] (stating
that classifying the Justices' preferences and votes as "liberal" or "conservative" is problematic,
since neither "liberal" nor "conservative" has a set definition); see also Ernest A. Young, The
Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 6 (2004) [hereinafter Young, Two
Federalisms] ("[P]art of my point is that the most familiar labels are misleading. Many have
referred to 'conservative' and 'liberal' factions, but attaching a strong political valence to
federalism issues is problematic.... [O]ne of my primary arguments is that the putatively
nationalist four [justices, including Justice Ginsburg,] do, in fact, have their own vision of state
autonomy."). But see David R. Dow, Cassandra Jeu & Anthony C. Coveny, JudicialActivism on
the Rehnquist Court: An Empirical Assessment, 23 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 35, 49-50
(2008).
51. Mark Tushnet recognized the Democratic Party's established preference for national
power and noted that, what he called the "modem" Republican Party, favored limited national
power and greater state sovereignty: "The Republican majority in Congress after 1994 had views
about national power more in line with the Court's than with Great Society Democrats' views."
MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 277 (2005).
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Justice Ginsburg's nuanced embrace of this traditionally conservative issue should
not be a surprise. 52 Her respect for state autonomy is a natural consequence of her well-
documented judicial modesty.5 3 Judicial restraint is especially important with regard to
federalism because, as Robert Schapiro put it, much of the Court's federalism
jurisprudence is "fundamentally a theory of judicial review, not a theory of
federalism."' 4 That is, federalism has practical significance in the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence chiefly as a framework for determining the judiciary's role in answering
questions about the scope and meaning of state autonomy and federal power. Two
answers have emerged. On the one hand, process federalism largely rejects a role for
the judiciary in enforcing a boundary between state and federal authority.5 5 On the
other hand, proponents of dual sovereignty call for vigorous judicial scrutiny of federal
actions to ensure that state autonomy is not compromised.
5 6
In the following Part, I demonstrate the centrist character of President Clinton's and
Justice Ginsburg's federalism. First, I show that President Clinton's pro-state
federalism policies were a showpiece of his centrist, New Democratic presidency.
Second, I argue that Justice Ginsburg has shown a marked commitment to state
autonomy in the opinions she has authored or joined. I conclude with a more focused
examination of the preemption doctrine. Justice Ginsburg has been particularly active
in the preemption field, 7 and the Clinton administration had a noteworthy engagement
52. Wilkins's team regarded Ginsburg's pro-state federalism jurisprudence as
"[i]nteresting[ ]" and "surprising." Wilkins et al., supra note 46, at 61, 82; cf Daniel R. Gordon,
Revisiting Erie, Guaranty Trust, and Gasperini: The Role of Jewish History in Fashioning
Modern American Federalism, 26 U. SEATTLE L. REV. 213 (2002) (placing Ginsburg in the
lineage of Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter as Jewish justices whose experience of Jewish
historical social experience in Europe and America infused them with a sympathy for localism
and mobility amongst a diverse set of autonomous governments). A more direct link might be
made as a matter of academic lineage. Paul Freund served as Brandeis's law clerk and was
teaching at Harvard Law School during Ginsburg's time there.
53. See supra note 37.
54. Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory ofInteractive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243,
279 (2005).
55. See infra text accompanying note 150.
56. Norman W. Spaulding, Constitution as Countermonument: Federalism, Reconstruction
and the Problem of Collective Memory, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1992, 2012 (2003) ("In United
States v. Morrison, where the principles underlying Lopez and Boerne converge, the Court is
even more explicit about protecting federalism principles. In striking down the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA) as beyond both the commerce power and the enforcement powers
conferred by the Fourteenth Amendment, the majority again insisted that vigorous judicial
review is essential to the preservation of dual sovereignty." (citations omitted)).
57. See Wyeth v. Levin, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (Justice Ginsburg joined the majority,
which held that federal labeling regulations did not preempt state law failure-to-warn claims
against drug manufacturers); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1013 (2008) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (Justice Ginsburg, as the sole dissenter, would have found that the federal FDA
premarket approval scheme for medical equipment did not preempt state common-law tort
claims); Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408,2419 (2008) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Breyer's conclusion that the federal National Labor
Relations Act did not preempt state statutes governing distribution of union dues); Mid-Con
Freight Sys. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545 U.S. 440, 440 (2005) (Justice Ginsburgjoined
the majority opinion holding that the federal Single State Registration System law did not
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with the issue.58 I argue that the preemption doctrine confirms their shared, centrist
approach to federalism, a position bolstered by a prominent scholar's claim that, with
respect to state autonomy, the preemption doctrine matters more than other federalism
issues.59
preempt a state statute requiring registration fees); Bates v. Dow Agrosciences L.L.C., 544 U.S.
431, 431 (2005) (Justice Ginsburg joined the majority opinion, which held that the labeling
requirement included in the federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act did not preempt
state tort claims); Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 125 (2004) (Justice Ginsburg
joined the majority, which held that the federal Telecommunications Act did not have
preemptive effect on the activities of state-owned entities); Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539
U.S. 396, 430 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (Justice Ginsburg, writing for the four
dissenters, would have found that federal foreign-affairs policies did not preempt the California
Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act); Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S.
644, 644 (2003) (Justice Ginsburg joined the majority opinion, which held that the federal
Medicaid law did not preempt Maine's prescription drug plan); Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone
Indians, 538 U.S. 701, 701 (2003) (Justice Ginsburg authored the majority opinion, which held
that federal sovereign immunity provisions did not preempt state court summons served on
Paiute-Shoshone Tribe); City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424,
424 (2002) (Justice Ginsburg authored the majority opinion holding that exceptions to federal
interstate transportation laws apply to municipalities and that municipality's regulations are not
preempted); Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 355 (2002) (Justice Ginsburg
joined the majority opinion, which held that the federal Employee Retirement Income Security
Act did not preempt Illinois law allowing insured persons to demand an independent review
decision); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 861 (2000) (Justice Ginsburg joined
the dissent, which would have held that the federal National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act did not preempt state common law tort claims.); Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S.
344, 360 (2000) (Justice Ginsburg authored the dissenting opinion, which would have found
that safety funds allocated pursuant to the federal Railroad Safety Act did not preempt state
common law tort claims); UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 358 (1999)
(Justice Ginsburg authored the majority opinion, which held that the federal Employee
Retirement Income Security Act did not preempt state disability benefits claims); Yamaha Motor
Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 199 (1996) (Justice Ginsburg authored the majority opinion,
which held that a federal maritime wrongful death cause of action did not preempt state common
law wrongful death claims).
58. See infra Part II.C.3; see also James T. O'Reilly, Losing Deference in the FDA 's
Second Century: Judicial Review, Politics, and a DiminishedLegacy of Expertise, 93 CORNELL
L. REV. 939, 953-54 (2007) ("The Bush Administration's political selection of Daniel Troy as
the FDA Chief Counsel was a controversial choice: Troy had once litigated for the drug and
tobacco industries against the FDA and was appointed to replace Margaret Jane Porter, who
disfavored federal preemption of tort cases."); Catherine M. Sharkey, What Riegel Portends For
FDA Preemption of State Law Products Liability Claims, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. 437, 447-48
(2009) ("Twelve years before Riegel, under the Clinton administration, the FDA publicly
endorsed an anti-preemption position vis-4-vis the MDA's regulation of medical devices. Before
the Court in Lohr, the [Clinton-era] FDA put forward a narrow view of its preemptive power,
emphasizing the manufacturer's ultimate responsibility for its design of medical devices. And
the year following Lohr, in an amicus brief urging the Court to grant certiorari in another
medical devices case (where the catheter device at issue had gone through the full PMA
process), the [Clinton-era] FDA took the position that the MDA's preemption provision is not
preemptive." (emphasis in original)).
59. If the Court's current majority won't stick up for the states, then who will? The
answer-and it is, alas, only a partial answer-might be surprising. The Court's
2010]
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
II. CLINTON'S AND GINSBURG'S CENTRIST FEDERALISM
A. President Clinton's Federalism
1. Introduction
President Clinton's New Democratic centrism sought to capture a number ofpolicy
positions that had long been the province of the right, while retaining the traditional
Democratic advantage over other issues.60 As Bruce Jansson put it, President Clinton
was "[c]apable of going in liberal or conservative directions, [he] was also adept at
splitting the difference." 61 A shift to the center on federalism was a part of this
maneuver.62 At the end of his first year in office, President Clinton addressed the
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, a body he reinvigorated in one
nationalist minority [including Justice Ginsburg] ... has been quietly developing
its own theory of federalism. That theory, I will argue, is strongest precisely where
the majority's theory is weak-that is, in its protection for state regulatory
prerogatives in preemption cases. ... [This approach] has the potential to do a
great deal of good in terms of protecting regulatory authority.
Ernest A. Young, Two Cheersfor Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1380-81 (2001).
60. See BRUCE S. JANssON, THE SIXTEEN-TRILION-DOLLAR MISTAKE 296-97 (2001). "Why
not, Clinton asked, make major changes in Democrats' ideology under the rubric of 'New
Democrats'?"(citation omitted). Id. at 296. These changes would emphasize the economic needs
of the middle class, emphasize a narrow range of economic reform, favor balanced budgets, and
emphasize "the obligations of citizens to work, raise families, and obey laws." Id. at 296-97.
61. Id. at296.
62. New Democratic policy statements have rarely engaged judicial and constitutional
matters like federalism as interests unto themselves. If they are given attention at all it is when
they are caught up in policy matters of wider appeal, like welfare and education reform. In his
survey of the New Democratic movement, for example, Kenneth Baer makes only two brief
references to the Supreme Court and no references to judicial activism or federalism. KENNETH
S. BAER, REINVENTING DEMOCRATS: THE POLITICS OF LIBERALISM FROM REAGAN TO CLINTON
(2000). Similarly, in his autobiography, President Clinton also fails to directly address issues
like judicial activism and federalism, although he characterizes the Supreme Court's
intervention in the 2000 Presidential Election recount as an "act ofjudicial activism that might
have made even Bob Bork blush." CLINTON, supra note 13, at 337. His discussion of his
nominations of Justices Ginsburg and Breyer merit a total of three pages with no treatment of
their constitutional philosophy. See id. at 524-25, 592.
Political scientists and legal scholars have given President Clinton mixed scores on his
federalism record. See James E. Kunde & Carl W. Stenberg, How Will the Clinton Era Affect
State and Local Government? Some Early Views, 25 ST. & LOC. GOv'T REv. 207 (1993);
Timothy Lynch, Dereliction of Duty: The Constitutional Record of President Clinton, 27 CAP.
U. L. REv. 783 (1999); Michael A. Pagano & Ann O'M. Bowman, The State of American
Federalism, 1994-1995, PuBLius: J. FEDERALISM, Summer 1995, at 1; David B. Walker, The
Advent of an Ambiguous Federalism and the Emergence ofNew Federalism 111, 56 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 271 (1996); Carol S. Weissert & Sanford F. Schram, The State ofAmerican Federalism,
1997-1998, PuBLlus: J. FEDERALISM, Winter 1998, at 1; Carol S. Weissert & Sanford F. Schram,
The State of American Federalism, 1995-1996, PuBLIus: J. FEDERALISM, Summer 1996, at 1;
Jennie H. Blake, Note, Presidential Power Grab or Pure State Might? A Modern Debate Over
Executive Interpretations on Federalism, 2000 BYU L. REV. 293 (2000).
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of the first acts of his presidency, 63 and asserted: "Because I served a dozen years as
Governor, and worked on these federalism issues from another perspective,... I'm
very serious about these issues, and ... I want to pursue them vigorously, thoroughly,
consistently and with the appropriate level of visibility.
'
"64
This was more than spin. Devolution was a focus of the DLC's program, which
regarded federalism and local autonomy as essential to freeing, engaging, and
animating American society for the dynamic environment of the twenty-first century's
globalized, technologically infused market.65 In his keynote address at the DLC's 1991
Cleveland Convention, the event that launched his Presidential campaign, 66 then-
Governor Clinton underscored the necessity of "pushing decisions down to the lowest
possible level, empowering people, [and] increasing accountability." 67 The New
American Choice Resolution, adopted at the Cleveland Convention, reiterated the
theme of devolving centralized federal authority to the states:
The new choice we offer is a new public philosophy, not a new set of programs. It
is built on a set of common beliefs and broad national purposes, not on promises
to disparate interest groups. It looks for leadership not from Washington but from
States and communities that have become America 's laboratories of innovation.
68
The Cleveland Resolution explicitly staked a claim for enhancing the role and
authority of the states-paraphrasing Justice Brandeis's "laboratories of democracy 69
63. The successor entity to the Kestnbaum Commission, President Eisenhower's
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, was the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), which was created by Congress in 1959. An Act to
Establish a Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Pub. L. No. 86-380, 73 Stat. 703,
703-06 (1959) (repealed 1996). The ACIR was eliminated by the 104th Congress in 1996, An
Act to Provide or the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations to Continue in
Existence, and for Other purposes, Pub. L. No. 104-328, 110 Stat. 4004 (1996), somewhat in
conflict with the federalist priorities of the Republican majority. See Richard P. Nathan, Thomas
L. Gais & James W. Fosset, Bush Federalism: Is There One, What Is It, and How Does It
Differ?, http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/federalism/2003-11-07-bushfederalism is there-one
_what is _it and how does it differ.pdf.
64. Remarks to the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 2 PuB. PAPERS
2084,2085 (Dec. 1, 1993).
65. Clinton was cofounder of DLC and assumed the group's chairmanship in 1991.
CLINTON, supra note 13, at 357; JANssON, supra note 60, at 296-97.
66. See CLINTON, supra note 13, at 366-67 ("That speech was one of the most effective and
important I ever made. It captured the essence of what I had learned in seventeen years in
politics and what millions of Americans were thinking. It became the blueprint for my campaign
message, ... [a]nd by the rousing reception it received, the speech established me as perhaps the
leading spokesman for the course I passionately believed America should embrace. Several
people at the convention urged me to run for President, and I left Cleveland convinced that I had
a good chance to capture the Democratic nomination if I did run, and that I had to consider
entering the race.").
67. Clinton, supra note 15.
68. Democratic Leadership Council, The New American Choice Resolution (May 1, 1991),
http://www.dlc.org/documents/cleveland_proclamation.pdf (emphasis added).
69. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). In
a fascinating article, Daniel Gordon links Justice Ginsburg with two Jewish predecessors on the
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justification for state autonomy, an image that would prove a favorite of the President's
when he spoke on the issue of federalism.70 The public philosophy of the New
Democrats, the Resolution declared, "looks for leadership not from Washington but
from States and communities." 71 Thus, early in the run up to his presidential campaign,
Clinton wed himself to a New Democratic philosophy sympathetic to state authority.
This philosophy waged open war with the Democratic Party's historical preference for
the centralization of power born in F.D.R.'s New Deal, entrenched during the Civil
Rights struggle championed by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, and brought to its
fullest scope in President Johnson's "Great Society" agenda.72 This shift represented
the New Democrats' and Bill Clinton's clearest break from the thinking of the liberal
faction of the Democratic Party. The New Democrats believed that the federal
government should not be the primary focus for reform efforts. Instead, they argued
that answers to society's problems and the provision of social goods should be sought
first in the private sector, then among local and state governments, and at the federal
level only as a last resort. 3
It must be noted, however, that this rightward realignment of the Democratic Party's
relationship to state autonomy is nothing so radical as the federalism dogma of the
prevailing conservative faith, which, in its extreme form, advocates a return to the
system of dual sovereignty and limited federal authority that characterized early
American federalism. 74 Instead, President Clinton's federalism sought a centrist
realignment of the Democratic Party on the issue, while remaining firmly rooted in the
well-established system of American "cooperative federalism"--the "reality of shared
[state and federal] financing and administrative responsibilities that emerged during
and after the New Deal in contrast to the theory of 'dual federalism' that prevailed
Court, Justices Frankfurter and Brandeis, as possessed of a distinct passion for American
federalism rooted in their unique experiences with and exposure to "Jewish localism." Gordon,
supra note 52, at 221-26, 232-40.
70. See, e.g., Remarks by the President to the National Governor's Association Conference,
1 PuB. PAPERS 154 (Feb. 1, 1994). "I do believe the States are the laboratories of democracy."
Id. at 155. In this example, President Clinton used Justice Brandeis' "laboratories of
democracy." Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
71. Democratic Leadership Council, supra note 68.
72. See supra note 51.
73. BAER, supra note 62, at 264-65. Elsewhere, Baer describes this antifederal mandate in
these terms: "[B]y stressing the need to reinvent government, the DLC stepped up its attack on
the federal bureaucracy and on the theory of governance implicit in the liberal public
philosophy, which called for the federal government to be the primary agent of change." Id. at
179.
74. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 751 (2002) ("Dual
sovereignty is a defining feature of our Nation's constitutional blueprint."); Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) ("Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a
federal regulatory program. Today we hold that Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by
conscripting the State's officers directly.... [Sluch commands are fundamentally incompatible
with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty." (emphasis added)); see also Roger Pilon,
Federalism & Separation of Powers: Dragooning State Officials into Federal Service,
FEDERALISM & SEPARATION PowERs PRAc. GROUP NEwSL. (The Federalist Soc'y for Law & Pub.
Policy), Dec. 1, 1996, available at http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/pubid.1584/pub
_detail.asp (crediting the "premise of the Constitution and the theory and history of dual
sovereignty").
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before the 1930s. ' '7 Thus, in his speeches and remarks, President Clinton repeatedly
referred to the ideal intergovernmental dynamic as a "partnership.,
76
Having won the White House, President Clinton pursued New Democratic
federalism, "a reinvigorated federal-state-local partnership,, 77 along three distinct
lines: reinventing the federal government; reforming federal grant programs, including
their attending intergovernmental implications; and a stumbling, perhaps even
inconsistent engagement with the preemption doctrine.78 The first and second of these
approaches were outlined in a detailed position paper written by Clinton administration
domestic-policy advisers William Galston and Geoffrey Tibbetts and published in
Publius: The Journal ofFederalism in the summer of 1994.79 Here, I survey President
75. This term [cooperative federalism] envisions a balance between federal
leadership and state autonomy .... The principles of cooperative federalism have
been broadly applied by both the Reagan and [George H.W.] Bush administrations
under Executive Order 12612, adopted October 26, 1987, and reconfirmed on
February 16, 1990. Under this Executive Order, federal agencies are to accord
states maximum discretion in implementing national programs administered by the
states. [National programs that intend to rely on cooperative federalism often
reflect] congressional intent that 'the primary governmental responsibility for
developing, authorizing, issuing and enforcing regulations for surface [pursuant to
the Surface Mining] Act should rest with the states.
Denise A. Dragoo, West of the 100th Meridian: Implementation of the Surface Mining and
Reclamation Act in the Western States, in MOVING THE EARTH: COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SURFACE MINING ACT 167, 169 (Uday Desai ed., 1993) (quoting 30
U.S.C. § 1201(f) (1988)) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original); see ARTHUR GuNucicKs, TI-E
LANDER AND GERMAN FEDERALISM 61 (2003).
Cooperative federalism was championed most enthusiastically during Lyndon
Johnson's Great Society programs in the 1960s, and it continued to grow even
under the more cautious Richard Nixon, whose "new federalism" tried to remove
to some extent the federal bureaucracy from its heavy involvement in state and
local governments through such innovations as revenue sharing. A reaction set in
with Ronald Regan, whose 'new federalism' was more like the old dual federalism
in that he sought to "sort out" the responsibilities of the different levels and, in the
process, return a number of important functions to the states. Since this was to
include the financing of these activities, the support of many governors and
interest groups was not very strong, and in the end little actual "sorting out"
occurred.
GuNLICKs, supra at 386.
76. Remarks to the National Governors Association, 1 PuB. PAPERS 112 (Jan. 30, 1995).
"The second thing I'd like to talk about is, very briefly, is [sic] the commitment that I made 2
years ago to have a better, stronger partnership with the States .... Id. at 113.
77. Galston & Tibbetts, supra note 13, at 24.
78. In his remarks to the National Governors Association in 1995, highlighting the
administration's early success with respect to devolution, President Clinton identified the first
two of these approaches to the federalism issue: "[W]e have worked not simply to reduce the
size of the Federal Government... but also to try to move more responsibility to the States."
Remarks to the National Governors Association, supra note 76, at 113. As examples of the
latter, President Clinton cited health-care and welfare reform as well as the unfunded mandates
legislation. Id.
79. Galston & Tibbetts, supra note 13; see also REBECCAM. BLANK, IT TAKES ANATION: A
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Clinton's "reinventing" and "reform" initiatives with special consideration given to
their federalism implications. I examine President Clinton's preemption-doctrine policy
alongside Justice Ginsburg's preemption-doctrine jurisprudence in the concluding
subpart of this Part of the Article.
80
2. Reinventing
In the first instance, President Clinton's centrist federalism took the form of an
aggressive effort to reduce the size, limit the unnecessary reach, and improve the
quality of service of the federal government under the banner of Vice President Al
Gore's National Partnership for Reinventing Government (NPRG).S' President Clinton
explained that the administration's objective for the NPRG was to "make the entire
Federal Government both less expensive and more efficient, and to change the culture
of our national bureaucracy away from complacency and entitlement toward initiative
and empowerment."8 2 This was more than just an effort at "Creating a Government that
Works Better and Costs Less."8 3 Galston and Tibbetts described the project as "a
workable and realistic philosophy of federalism that can empower federal, state, and
local governments and enhance the partnership in intergovernmental service
delivery."
84
At the close of the second Clinton-Gore term, the National Partnership trumpeted its
major accomplishments, including reduction in the size of the federal civilian
workforce by 426,200 positions between 1993 and 2000,85 reduction in the size of
thirteen of the fourteen national administrative departments, 6 elimination of 640,000
NEW AGENDA FOR FIGHTING POVERTY 229-30 (1997) ("[Tlhe current dissatisfaction with
federally run programs and the movement to greater state control make nationally focused
programs less likely to get on the political agenda.... Since the early 1980s, there have been a
series of initiatives aimed at reducing the size of federal government (President Clinton's
'reinventing government' initiative is the latest) and at simplifying or reducing federal
regulations on private industry and on state and local governments. The move to reduce federal
control over public assistance programs is of a piece with these efforts." (emphasis in original)).
80. See infra Part II.C.3.
81. In his autobiography President Clinton repeatedly credits Vice President Gore with the
responsibility for the administration's Reinventing Government initiative and its significant
successes. CLINTON, supra note 13, at 513, 614, 647, 694.
82. Remarks Announcing the National Performance Review, 1 PuB. PAPERS 233,233 (Mar.
3 1993); see also Galston & Tibbetts, supra note 13, at 25 ("On 3 March 1993 president Clinton
announced his 'Reinventing Government initiative' and charged Vice President Gore to move it
forward. The president stated the administration's objective: 'Our goal is to make the entire
Federal government both less expensive and more efficient, and to change the culture of our
national bureaucracy away from complacency and entitlement toward initiative and
empowerment."' (quoting Remarks Announcing the Initiative to Streamline Government, 29
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 350 (Mar. 3 1993))).
83. AL GORE, CREATING A GoERNMENT THAT WORKS BETru AND COSTS LESS (1994). The
title of Vice President Gore's first report is tediously descriptive.
84. Galston & Tibbetts, supra note 13, at 25-26.
85. John Kamensky, History of the National Partnership for Reinventing Government:
Accomplishments 1993-2000: A Summary (Jan. 12, 2001), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr
/whoweare/appendixf.html.
86. Id.
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pages of internal agency rules,87 and the doubling of Americans' trust in the federal
government.88 The benefits accruing to the states from the resulting improvements in
the functioning of the federal government were not insignificant, 89 especially when
linked to specific intergovernmental collaborative projects. 90 But the gains for the
states were collateral, amounting to a pruning of the federal partner in the state-federal
cooperative scheme and presenting the states with an opportunity to flex their authority
by filling in the gaps. In the end, federal efficiency and efficacy was the focus of the
enterprise, not the emboldening of the states.
In his 1996 State of the Union address, President Clinton acknowledged this
incidental, federalism-value-added aspect of the reinvention project. The last of seven
challenges identified by the President in that speech was the acknowledgement that
"the era of big government is over."91 The administration's embrace of this challenge
had the related effect, the President noted, of shifting "more decisionmaking out of
Washington, back to the States and local communities. 92
3. Reforming
The integrity and autonomy of the states were squarely at issue in President
Clinton's welfare and unfunded mandate reforms.93 Certainly, elements of these
initiatives were linked to broader New Democratic aims that had no particular concern
for federalism interests. But the states were so intimately entangled in the
administration of the implicated federal programs that any real reform would impact
them directly. President Clinton embraced the potential for bolstering the states'
responsibility and authority in his welfare and unfunded mandates reform initiatives by
seeking to release states from the heavy hand of the federal government in the state-
federal cooperative scheme while at the same time learning from and drawing upon
state-based innovations resulting from this loosening in the formulation of federal
targets.
a. Welfare Reform
Entitlement reform was a fundamental tenet of President Clinton's New Democratic
agenda and featured prominently in his 1992 campaign, during which he promised to
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. DONALD F. KErn, ELAIN KAMARCK, STEvEN KELMEN & JOHN C. DONAHUE, PAPER 3-98,
ASSESSING REINVENTION AS A MAJOR REFORM: A CONVERSATION (1998), available at
http://ashinstitute.harvard.edu/ash/kettl.pdf; see also Kamensky, supra note 85.
90. See id. ("In 1993, NPR recommended changes to how the federal government works
with states and communities to streamline the bureaucracy and increase the focus on results and
services to citizens. NPR was the catalyst for a number of initiatives that brought federal
agencies together with states and communities to focus on and share accountability for results
and to create more seamless service delivery.").
91. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 1 PuB.
PAPERS 79, 79 (Jan. 23, 1996).
92. Id. at 85.
93. See infra Parts II.A.3.a, II.A.3.b.
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"end welfare as we know it."94 President Clinton saw welfare reform as a "way out of
being branded [a] welfare liberal., 95 State autonomy was both the essential driver and
aim of this maneuver. Many states had freed themselves from the welfare regime's
federal shackles with the help of waivers and block grants introduced during the
Reagan administration and expanded during the first years of the Clinton
administration.96 The states' experiments with entitlement programs increased the
pressure on the federal government to undertake reform and, where successful, the
state policies became the models for the federal reform that ultimately was adopted.97
The states played a significant role in the negotiations for and enactment of the federal
reform. Not surprisingly, the reform seemed to complete the circle by offering the
states expanded autonomy over the social policy areas implicated by entitlements.
Fulfilling his campaign promise, President Clinton signed the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 199698 ("Act") on August
22, 1996. 99 At the signing, President Clinton said "[t]oday we have a historic
responsibility to make welfare what it was meant to be-a second chance, not a way of
life."100 The Act worked a complete restructuring of the American welfare system,
including the underlying philosophy. In regard to the latter, the reform abandoned the
notion of "entitlement" and replaced it with the idea that welfare would be a form of
"cash assistance for individuals ... conditioned on meeting work (or job-seeking)
requirements and adhering to personal responsibility codes or contracts."'' 1 The goal
was to end cycles of poverty and dependence;'0 2 to achieve this goal the Act authorized
the federal government to establish and insist upon the fulfillment of the mandate that
94. Richard L. Berke, The Ad Campaign; Clinton: Getting People Off Welfare, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 10, 1992, at A20; see also GARY C. BRYNER, POLITICS AND PUBLIC MORALrry: THE GREAT
AMERICAN WELFARE REFORM DEBATE 77-78 (1998); JOEL F. HANDLER, THE POVERTY OF
WELFARE REFORM 1 (1995); BRENDON O'CONNOR, A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
WELFARE SYSTEM: WHEN IDEAS HAVE CONSEQUENCES 4 (2004).
95. O'CoNNOR, supra note 94, at 7.
96. See generally id. at 92.
97. See generally id. at 93-95, 101.
98. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 14 U.S.C.).
99. Id.; see also Peter Edelman, The Worst Thing Bill Clinton Has Done, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Mar. 1997, at 43.
100. Elizabeth Shogren, Clinton Accepts Broad Welfare Changes as "Last Best Chance,"
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1996, at Al; see also John F. Harris & John E. Yang, Clinton to Sign Bill
Overhauling Welfare, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1996, at Al.
101. Jon Michaels, Deforming Welfare: How the Dominant Narratives of Devolution and
Privatization Subverted Federal Welfare Reform, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 573, 592 (2004).
102. See John P. Collins Jr., Development in Policy: Welfare Reform, 16 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 221, 221 (1997); Nichola L. Marshall, The Welfare Reform Act of 1996: Political
Compromise or Panacea for Welfare Dependency?, 4 GEO. J. FIGHTING POVERTY 333, 333-35,
339-41 (1997). But see Michaels, supra note 101, at 592-93 ("[The Act] was a declaratory
manifesto describing both Congress's abdication of its commitment to welfare as an entitlement
and its refusal to subsidize the nonworking (undeserving) poor. Its intentions and goals were
quite clear: replace AFDC [Aid to Families with Dependent Children] with a temporary, time-
limited assistance program... and insist those receiving transitional benefits begin the process
of finding work." (citations omitted)).
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welfare foster work rather than dependence, that it be tied to necessary education and
transportation reform to make the transition to work possible, and that ending
entitlements not compromise the health and well-being of needy children.
Federalism was more significantly impacted by the Act's structural reform, which
devolved responsibility for administering welfare, "turning what used to be a federal,
centralized system over to the states."'°3 The federal government would find the broad
mandates of the new philosophy through state-specific block grants and leave the
details to the states and localities in order to ensure a "maximum flexibility" '04 in
meeting the federal targets. Particularly with respect to the Act's Temporary Assistance
to Needy Families (TANF) provisions, 10 5 the common view is that the states acquired a
significant degree of autonomy. Welfare became a "nationwide patchwork of block
grant programs to be administered with nearly complete state discretion and little
federal oversight."l1°6 Representatives and agents of state authority clamored after the
reform. The Democratic Governors Association praised President Clinton for signing
the Act, noting especially that it would increase state power.10 7 The National
Governors Association was instrumental in the Act's passage1 °i The National
Conference of State Legislatures endorsed the Act and, in a letter included in the
Congressional Record, declared itself particularly pleased with the administrative
flexibility the reform bestowed on the states to manage the welfare system. 1°9
Representative Lee Hamilton remarked that the Act
turns upside down the relationship between Washington and the states on welfare
.... Under this bill, the federal and state governments will continue to share the
cost but each state will manage its own program and be responsible for coming up
with extra money if the federal money is not enough. Much responsibility now
rests with the states.°
10
Nina Mendelson noted that, upon signing the Act, President Clinton claimed that the
effort had largely been in response to demands from governors."' "'The governors,'
Mr. Clinton noted, 'asked for this responsibility. Now they've got to live up to it."" ' 
2
103. Dan Froomkin, Welfare's Changing Face, WASH. POST.COM, July 23, 1998, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/welfare/welfare.htm.
104. Remarks to the National Governors Association, supra note 76; see also Gary Bryner &
Ryan Martin, Innovation in Welfare Policy: Evaluating State Efforts to Encourage WorkAmong
Low-Income Families, 22 REv. POL'Y RES. 3325 (2005).
105. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601(a)(l)-(4) (2006).
106. Collins, supra note 102, at 241; see also Maureen Berner, Welfare Reform: Testing the
Ability of the Block Grant Formula to Meet States'Need, SPECTRUM, Fall 1996, at 38, 38.
107. Harris & Yang, supra note 100.
108. MARY REINTSMA, THE PoLrrlCAL ECONOMY OF WELFARE REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES
76 (2007).
109. 142 CONG. REc. 20,730 (1996) (statement of Rep. McCarthy).
110. 142 CONG. REc. 22,782-83 (1996) (statement of Rep. Hamilton).
111. Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REv. 737, 771 (2004).
112. Francis X. Clines, Clinton Signs Bill Cutting Welfare; States in New Role, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 23, 1996, at Al.
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But President Clinton coveted welfare reform no less than the states. Particularly in
its devolutionary facets, the Act fed his centrist, pro-state federalism ambitions."13
Robert Cherry commented that President Clinton's centrist approach to welfare
"rejected conservative views that there is no need for government to financially support
[the needy] ... and no need to be concerned with their standard of living. It also
rejected traditional liberal views that welfare must remain an entitlement .... In
this sense, welfare reform was a piece of President Clinton's New Democratic agenda,
representing a third way between the entrenched positions of liberals and
conservatives. Ultimately, welfare reform, with its attendant expansion of state
autonomy, featured prominently in the New Democrats' centrist self-image. "You
know, Bill Clinton saved the Democratic Party," Paul Begala declared on Crossfire,
"by pulling us back to the center, by disagreeing with the liberals on welfare
reform."' 15
b. Federal Unfunded Mandates Reform
Of even greater concern to the states at the beginning of the Clinton administration,
however, was the burdensome practice of "unfunded federal mandates."" 6 Unfunded
mandates involve requirements imposed by Congress on state or local governments
without the accompanying funding to cover the costs of the required actions or
programs.' 17 While the outrage over unfunded mandates had its basis, at least partially,
in budgetary concerns or disapproval of the substance of the federal policy, the
113. Franklin Foer, Essay, The Joy of Federalism, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, at F12
("Federalism suited [Clinton's] declared ambition to move beyond the era of 'big government.'
... The welfare reform package he ushered into law [in 1996] gave states enormous latitude in
remaking social policy."). These ambitions dated back to his tenure as Arkansas' governor,
during which he "led governors' efforts to reform welfare." BRYNER, supra note 94, at 77.
114. ROBERT CHERRY, WELFARE TRANSFORMED: UNIVERSALIZING FAMILY POLICIES THAT
WORK 19-20 (2007).
115. JOEL BLAU, THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY 118 (2d ed. 2007).
116. U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, FEDERALLY INDUCED
COSTS AFFECTING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, at iii (1993) ("In 1993, the term 'unfunded
federal mandates' became the rallying cry for one of the most contentious intergovernmental
issues in recent times.").
117. Markam B. Jaber explained:
The recently enacted "Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 1995". . .adopts (albeit
for a limited purpose) a definition broader than the two definitions discussed
above .... [T]he term 'Federal mandate' means any provision in a statute or
regulation of any Federal court ruling that imposes an enforceable duty upon State,
local, or tribal governments including a condition of Federal assistance or duty
arising from participation in a voluntary Federal program." Read liberally, this
definition considers as an "unfunded federal mandate" any federal statute or
regulation that results in any duties imposed on state or local governments, even if
the state takes on such duties voluntarily, so long as the resulting costs to these
governments are not directly and fully funded by the federal government.
Markam B. Jaber, Comment, Unfunded Federal Mandates: An Issue of Federalism or a
"Brilliant Sound Bite"?, 45 EMORY L.J. 281, 287-88 (1996) (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 1555)
(citations omitted).
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underlying concern was federalism and state autonomy." 8 The critics argued that
unfunded federal mandates require states to "divert a portion of their resources...
[and] displace local preferences." '" 9 The critics also argued that unfunded federal
mandates blurred the lines of political accountability built into the federal structure by
allowing "Congress to reap the political benefit of passing popular legislation, while
state and local officials are held accountable for raising taxes--or cutting spending in
another area-to pay for implementing or complying with the legislation."'20 A final,
more generalized, federalism critique argued that unfunded federal mandates
represented another form of general, federal aggrandizement at the expense of the
states and their often more effective or creative policies.' 2' Rena Steinzor summarized
the objections in these terms: "In essence, state and local governments argue that they
should not be compelled to carry out, much less pay for, any more bright ideas that
originate at the federal level."'
122
The Clinton administration moved quickly to meet the states' concerns on unfunded
mandates. 23 In October 1993, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,875-
Enhancing the Intergovernmental Partnership-which recognized that "the cumulative
effect of unfunded Federal mandates has increasingly strained the budgets of State,
local, and tribal governments."'124 The Executive Order concluded that "[t]hese
governments should have more flexibility to design solutions to the problems faced by
citizens in this country without excessive micromanagement and unnecessary
regulation from the Federal Government."' 125 President Clinton responded to these
concerns, ordering a "[rleduction [in] [u]nfunded [m]andates" by: (1) prohibiting
agency promulgation of unnecessary (not statutorily required) regulations that create an
unfunded mandate; 126 and (2) requiring agencies to receive intergovernmental input in
the development of "regulatory proposals containing significant unfunded
mandates."'
127
President Clinton followed through on the promise of Executive Order 12,875 by
closely consulting with the bipartisan Congressional sponsors of legislation that sought
to extend his Executive Order's agency limitations on unfunded mandates to
Congress. 128 When the negotiations on the bill met with fierce opposition from
Congressional Democrats,129 President Clinton publicly endorsed the law in an effort to
118. Id. at296.
119. Id.
120. Id. at297.
121. Id.
122. Rena Steinzor, Unfunded Environmental Mandates and the "New (New) Federalism":
Devolution, Revolution, or Reform?, 81 MINN. L. REv. 97, 112 (1996).
123. The Republicans responded by making federalism a centerpiece of their 1994 "Contract
with America." See CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH, REP.
DICK ARMEY, AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION 125 (Ed Gillespie & Bob
Schellhas eds., 1994).
124. Exec. Order No. 12,875, 3 C.F.R. 669, 669-71 (1994).
125. Id. at 670.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Statement on Unfunded Federal Mandates Reform Legislation, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1696
(Oct. 4, 1994).
129. David S. Broder, Those Unfunded Mandates, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 2005, at A25
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dislodge the logjam. 30 The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) 13 1 aimed, inter
alia, at strengthening the "partnership between the Federal Government and State,
local, and tribal governments, '  and at bringing to an "end the imposition, in the
absence of full consideration by Congress, of Federal mandates on State, local, and
tribal governments without adequate Federal funding, in a manner that may displace
other essential State, local, and tribal governmental priorities."' 33At the signing
ceremony for the UMRA, President Clinton underscored his strong support for the law
and clearly articulated the centrist, New Democratic vision of federalism he hoped it
would advance:
Now, this unfunded mandates law will be another model for how we have to
continue to change the way Washington does business. The best ideas and the
most important work that affect the public interest are often done a long way away
from Washington. This bill is another acknowledgment that Washington doesn't
necessarily have all the answers, that we have to continue to push decision making
down to the local level, and we shouldn't make the work of governing at the local
level any harder than the circumstances of the time already ensure that it will be.
You know, our Founders gave us strong, guiding principles about how our
governments ought to work, and they trusted us in every generation to reinvigorate
the partnership they created with such wisdom so long ago. For 200 years, we've
had to do that over and over and over, and about once a generation, we had to
make some really big changes in the way we work together as a people, citizens in
their private lives, local governments, State governments, and our Government
here in Washington.
Today, we are making history. We are working to find the right balance for the
21 st century. We are recognizing that the pendulum had swung too far and that we
have to rely on the initiative, the creativity, the determination, and the
decisionmaking of people at the State and local level to carry much of the load for
America as we move into the 21st century.'
34
("Democrats, whose 40-year grip on the House of Representatives had just been shattered by the
Republican revolution of 1994, were overwhelmingly opposed.").
130. See Statement on Unfunded Federal Mandates Reform Legislation, supra note 128, at
1696.
131. Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
132. 2 U.S.C. § 1501(1) (2006).
133. 2 U.S.C. § 1501(2) (2006).
134. Remarks by the President at Signing Ceremony for the Unfunded Mandate Reform Act
of 1995, 1 Pun. PAPERS 381,382 (Mar. 22, 1995). The Congressional Budget Office concluded
that the number of bills containing mandates covered by the UMRA decreased by more than one
third between 1996 and 2002. PIETRo NiVOLA, FIscAL MILESTONES ON THE CreEs: REViSING
THE PROBLEM OF FEDERAL MANDATES 2 (2003). Despite the UMRA, states continue to bear a
considerable burden for federal policy initiatives. See States Get Stuck with $29 Billion Bill:
Federal Unfunded Mandate Gap to Reach $34 Billion in FY 2005, NAT'L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES NEWS, Mar. 10, 2005, http://ecom.ncsl.org/programs/press/2004/pr040310.htm.
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4. Conclusion
Throughout his eight years in the White House, President Clinton sought to
strengthen the position of the states, especially in their relationship with the federal
government. First, he reduced the federal government's footprint. This had the residual
effect of giving the states the opportunity to fill the power vacuum left by the
reductionist "reinvention" of the federal government. Second, some of President
Clinton's reforms depended on actualizing and expanding the states' governing
autonomy. But the newly liberated states were not to be abandoned to their own
devices. President Clinton saw them acting as intersubjective partners in cooperation
with the federal government. This role, however, would be performed through the
medium of national politics. These elements-respect for states' governing autonomy
and the exercise of that autonomy as intersubjective actors in the national political
process--emerge as central to Justice Ginsburg's federalism jurisprudence as well.
B. Justice Ginsburg's Federalism
1. Introduction
Congruent with the pro-state tenor of President Clinton's federalism, Justice
Ginsburg has vigorously defended a secure role for the states in our federalist structure.
In ways that echo President Clinton's centrist federalism, Justice Ginsburg's opinions
and the opinions she joins reveal her to be a centrist on federalism.' 35 She offers an
affirmative vision of the states as institutions, rather than choosing to define them only
as an implied foil derived from the limits on federal sovereignty and power. In her
opinions, the states appear as intersubjective and autonomous centers of governing
authority. In this respect, she is particularly concerned with showing respect for the
integrity of state institutions, including state legislatures, state executive officials, and
especially state courts. And, in a matter wholly irrelevant to President Clinton's
federalism policy, Justice Ginsburg's pro-states posture is further evident in her
fundamental judicial modesty.' 3 6 Justice Ginsburg responds to Schapiro's caricature of
the inflated role ofjudicial review in federalism jurisprudence by advocating judicial
restraint on this issue.
13 7
Justice Ginsburg shares President Clinton's centrist federalism because, through the
vision of states as autonomous and intersubjective centers of governance, she rejects
the extremes in the debate. By insisting on viable and active states she necessarily
credits the central facet of the dual-sovereignty model of American federalism. At the
same time, Justice Ginsburg credits the nationalist model by insisting, for the most part,
that the states pursue these functions in the federal political process.
In the following two subparts I demonstrate the centrist character of Justice
Ginsburg's federalism jurisprudence through an examination of dissenting opinions she
has either written orjoined. I adopt this unique methodology for several reasons. First,
135. For this characterization of Justice Ginsburg's jurisprudence I have an acknowledged
debt to Professor Ernest Young's work. See, e.g., Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 50;
Young, supra note 59.
136. See Ginsburg, Judicial Voice, supra note 37, at 1198.
137. Id.; see Ginsburg, Thoughts, supra note 37, at 381-85.
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she often has written or joined strong dissenting opinions that raised alarm over
diminished state autonomy. Simply put, dissents are where one finds much of Justice
Ginsburg's most animated federalism jurisprudence. Second, dissenting opinions are a
particularly meaningful window into Justice Ginsburg's jurisprudence more generally
because she intends them to serve as strategic "pathmarking" efforts.
138
"[O]verindulgence in separate opinion writing," she cautions, "may undermine both the
reputation of the judiciary for judgment and the respect accorded court dispositions."' 139
Dissents "are not... devoutly to be avoided," 140 she explains, but should be deployed
when they are meant to "express a conviction, honestly and sincerely maintained."''
a
According to this standard, Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinions are uniquely
expressive of her views; a claim that has been enhanced by recent occasions on which
she has chosen to read her dissents from the bench. 42 Third, Justice Ginsburg's
dissents must serve as a fundamental part of any survey of her federalismjurisprudence
because they often put her at odds with Chief Justice Rehnquist's "New Federalism"
revolution. Establishing her federalism credibility, therefore, requires careful scrutiny
of the dissents she joined in the leading New Federalism cases that have come to serve
as the benchmark for commitment to state autonomy. That is where I turn now.
2. Dissenting from Rehnquist's New Federalism: Process Prevails
Justice Ginsburg can be credited with an "honestly and sincerely maintained'
'143
respect for state autonomy in "Our Federalism,"' 44 in spite of the fact that she joined
138. Ginsburg, Judicial Voice, supra note 37, at 1196; see Ray, supra note 37, at 654-73;
Linda Greenhouse, In Her First Case, Ginsburg Dissents, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1993, at A16.
139. Ginsburg, Judicial Voice, supra note 37, at 1191.
140. Id. at 1194.
141. Id. (quoting William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense ofDissents, 37 Hastings L.J. 427,437
(1986)) (quotation marks omitted).
142. Whatever else may be said about the Supreme Court's current term, which ends
in about a month, it will be remembered as the time when Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg found her voice, and used it. Both in the abortion case the court decided
last month and the discrimination ruling it issued on Tuesday, Justice Ginsburg
read forceful dissents from the bench .... [T]he words were clearly her own, and
they were both passionate and pointed .... To read a dissent aloud is an act of
theater that justices use to convey their view that the majority is not only mistaken,
but profoundly wrong. It happens just a handful of times a year.
Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Memo; Oral Dissents Give Ginsburg a New Voice, N.Y.
TIMES, May 31, 2007.
143. Ginsburg, Judicial Voice, supra note 37, at 1194 (quoting William J. Brennan, Jr., In
Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 437 (1986)).
144. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
This, perhaps for lack of a better and clearer way to describe it, is referred to by
many as "Our Federalism," and one familiar with the profound debates that
ushered our Federal Constitution into existence is bound to respect those who
remain loyal to the ideals and dreams of "Our Federalism." The concept does not
mean blind deference to "States' Rights" any more than it means centralization of
control over every important issue in our National Government and its courts. The
Framers rejected both these courses. What the concept does represent is a system
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dissents in "all of the New Federalism decisions of the modem Court.' 5 In these
cases, a thin majority of the Court, led by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, sought to
limit "the scope of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause and Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment; [revive] the Tenth Amendment as a constraint on federal
power; and greatly [expand] the scope of state sovereign immunity."' 146 These cases
served as the center of a renewed, 47 but now moribund, states' rights movement. 4 s
in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National
Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to
vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so
in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States. It
should never be forgotten that this slogan, "Our Federalism," born in the early
struggling days of our Union of States, occupies a highly important place in our
Nation's history and its future.
Id. at 44-45.
145. Ronald D. Rotunda, The New States 'Rights, The New Federalism, The New Commerce
Clause, and The Proposed New Abdication, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 869, 875 (2000)
(emphasis omitted).
146. Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When it Matters: A Different Approach to
Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1313 (2004) (citations omitted). Chemerinsky catalogued
the new federalism decisions that substantiate this proposition: United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995) (invalidating the Gun Free School Zone Act as exceeding the scope of Congress's
commerce power); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating the civil
damages provision of the Violence Against Women Act); City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997) (invalidating the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act as exceeding the scope of
Congress's Section Five powers); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (invalidating
provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Act as violating the Tenth Amendment); Printz
v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating the Brady Handgun Control Act as violating
the Tenth Amendment); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); and Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999)
(limiting Congress's power to authorize suits against state governments). Chemerinsky, supra, at
1313 nn.l-3.
With the exception of City of Boerne v. Flores, in which she joined Justice Kennedy's
majority opinion, and New York v. United States, which was decided before she joined the
Court, Justice Ginsburg joined a dissenting opinion in all of these cases. William Pryor labeled
Chief Jsutice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and Justice Kennedy
the "federalism five." William H. Pryor, Jr., The Demand for Clarity: Federalism, Statutory
Construction, and the 2000 Term, 32 CUMB. L. REv. 361, 361-62 (2002).
147. "The Rehnquist Court .. . [has exalted] 'states' rights' vis-h-vis the national
government ...." Michael S. Greve, Federalism's Frontier, 7 TEx. REv. L. & POL. 93, 96
(2002); see Randy Lee, The New Federalism: Discerning Truth in American Myths and
Legends, 12 WIDENER L.J. 537 (2003). As Harry Witte summarized:
If the Rehnquist Court is curtailing the power of Congress to regulate under the
Commerce Clause, rewriting the grant of congressional authority to regulate the
states under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and all but eliminating suits
by citizens against their state governments for violation of federal law, then surely
this must be a Court that is friendly to the interests of states.
Harry L. Witte, Commentary: Is the Rehnquist Court: A. A Friend of the States? B. A Friend of
the People? C. A Friend of the Court? D. None of the Above?, 12 WIDENER L.J. 585, 585-86
(2003) (citations omitted). Mark Tushnet recognized a Rehnquist "new federalism revolution"
that has assumed a "states' rights" mantle, but argued that it represented merely a revolution of
"federalism doctrine" and not a revolution regarding the "actual scope of national power."
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The dissents Justice Ginsburg joined in this line of cases express neither blind
devotion to national authority nor total disregard for state autonomy. 49 Instead, they
reveal Justice Ginsburg's rejection of the dual-sovereignty approach to federalism that
was being advanced by the Rehnquist Court's majority150 in favor of "process
federalism"-an alternative federalism approach that accepts that the autonomy ofthe
states is ensured through the influence they have in the political processes and
structures of the federal government. 51 As noted earlier, this is primarily a claim about
the adequacy of political process for preserving the constitution's federal structure and
the states' interests and, concomitantly, a rejection of the need for judicial enforcement
to achieve these ends. 152 Process federalism, it has been said, seeks to discredit a
particular species ofjudicial review.' 3 But it is by no means synonymous with hostility
to the states and the autonomy they enjoy in the constitution's federalism regime. To
the contrary, Justice Ginsburg's espousal of process federalism is attended by an
affirmative vision ofthe states as intersubjective and autonomous centers of governing
authority.
Herbert Wechsler most famously articulated the process federalism thesis in his
1954 article: The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government. 154 He argued that two
TusHmET, supra note 51, at 249-50. Sue Davis referred to Rehnquist's federalism jurisprudence
as a
doctrine of state sovereignty .... [It] entails a vision of the relationship between
the federal government and the states that is fundamentally at odds with the view
that prevailed on the Court from the late 1930s until the mid-1970s. A
commitment to shift power away from the federal government toward more
extensive, independent authority for the states ....
SUE DAvIs, JUSTiCE REHNQUIST AND THE CoNsTrruTIoN 142, 149 (1989).
148. In 2005, a majority of the Court, including committed New Federalist Justice Antonin
Scalia, seemed to turn back the New Federalism tide in a decision upholding the federal
Controlled Substance Act against a commerce clause challenge. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1
(2005); Simon Lazarus, Federalism R.I.P.?. Did the Roberts Hearings Junk the Rehnquist
Court's Federalism Revolution?, 56 DEPAuL L. REv. 1 (2006); Young, Just Blowing Smoke?,
supra note 50, at 2 ("Last Term's decision in Gonzales v Raich put the Court's seriousness [on
federalism] to the test .... ").
149. Michael Greve calls Justice Ginsburg an "aggressive nationalist[ ]." Greve, supra note
147, at 116. Ernest Young also refers to Justice Ginsburg and the dissenters in the New
Federalism cases as "nationalist[s]," but he credits them with having a "federalismjurisprudence
of their own," which offers some real benefits to the states, especially in those areas "that the
"states'-rights' majority has neglected." Young, supra note 59, at 1351-52.
150. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 751 (2002)
("[Dual sovereignty is a] defining feature of our Nation's constitutional blueprint."); Printz, 521
U.S. at 935 (concluding that "our constitutional system of dual sovereignty" is "fundamentally
incompatible" with conscripting state and local officials to carry out federal programs).
151. See Young, supra note 59, at 1357-61.
152. Dragoo, supra note 75, at 169.
153. See Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based
Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459, 1460 (2001).
154. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards ofFederalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954).
"Wechsler's article remains [process federalism's] chief intellectual prop. Remarkably, after
nearly halfa century, [it] continues to rank high on the list of most cited law review articles...."
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underappreciated features of the American constitutional framework supported the
claim that judicial review was not the exclusive means for protecting and preserving
state autonomy and state interests in the federal system: the states' continuing existence
and their still significant authority as separate regulatory and administrative organs;'
55
and the states' "role of great importance in the composition and selection of the central
government."' 156 The former point is a facet of the autonomy Justice Ginsburg's
federalism jurisprudence attributes to the states, which continue to enjoy "the positive
use of governmental authority."'15 7 Ernest Young explains that, in this vision, the states
are "predicated on active state governments with important responsibilities.
158
Wechsler focused in particular on the latter point, emphasizing the intersubjective role
of the states in the composition of the Senate, 59 House of Representatives,' 60 and the
selection of the President.161 Wechsler explained that this intersubjective vision of the
states, which is also a facet of Justice Ginsburg's federalism jurisprudence, "is
intrinsically well adapted to retarding or restraining new intrusions by the center on the
domain of the states.' ' 162 These political safeguards, in which the states themselves
participate as intersubjective agents, "cannot fail to function as the guardian of state
interests as such, when they are real enough to have political support.'
163
The Rehnquist Court's aggressive intervention on behalf of the states starting in the
early 1990s represented the fulfillment of decades of criticism of Wechsler's thesis,
164
which nonetheless survived to form the basis of Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.165 The Rehnquist Court's New
Federalism movement momentarily faltered in Garcia, as Justice Blackmun reversed
Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 215, 217 (2000).
155. Wechsler, supra note 154, at 543. "[T]he existence of the states as governmental
entities and as the sources of the standing law is in itself the prime determinant of our working
federalism, coloring the nature and the scope of our national legislative processes from their
inception." Id. at 546.
156. Id. at 543.
157. Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 50, at 14.
158. Id. at 63 (emphasis omitted).
159. Referring to the states' equal representation in the Senate and the resulting
disproportionate strength of the least populous states, he noted that the forty-nine votes in the
Senate needed for action could be secured by twenty-five states representing a mere nineteen
percent of the nation's population. Wechsler concluded that the "composition of the Senate is
intrinsically calculated to prevent intrusion from the center on subjects that dominant state
interests wish preserved for state control." Wechsler, supra note 154, at 547-48.
160. Wechsler attributed the states' influence over the House of Representatives to their
"control of voters' qualifications, on the one hand, and of districting, on the other." Id. at 548.
161. Id. at 553. Wechsler argued that "[flederalist considerations... play an important part
even in the selection of the President," as a result of the allocation of the Electoral College votes
to the states. Id. at 553, 557.
162. Id. at 558.
163. Id. at 548.
164. Kramer, supra note 154, at 218. "Today, however, Wechsler's theory is under siege.
The current Supreme Court is plainly willing, perhaps eager, to rethink its position, and a
growing chorus of academic voices insists that the failure of political safeguards justifies and
even demands more aggressive judicial intervention to protect the states."Id. (citations omitted).
165. 469 U.S. 528, 550-54 (1985).
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his vote from the early New Federalism case National League of Cities v. Usery.166 In
National League of Cities, Justice Blackmun joined a bare majority of the Court in
granting states immunity from federal regulation that impacted state governmental
functions judged by the courts to be "integral" or of "traditional" interest to a
sovereign.167 After ten years of participating in the judiciary's flailing efforts to define
the operative standards announced in National League of Cities, Justice Blackmun had
grown disillusioned. 68 In Garcia he rejected a role for the courts in delineating a
formal boundary between the states and the federal government, opting instead for
Wechsler's process federalism:
[T]he principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the
federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself. It is no
novelty to observe that the composition of the Federal Government was designed
in large part to protect the States from overreaching by Congress. The Framers
thus gave the States a role in the selection of both of the Executive and the
Legislative Branches of the Federal Government ....
The effectiveness of the federal political process in preserving the States'
interests is apparent even today in the course of federal legislation. On the one
hand, the States have been able to direct a substantial proportion of federal
revenues into their own treasuries in the form of general and program-specific
grants in aid.... Moreover, at the same time that the States have exercised their
influence to obtain federal support, they have been able to exempt themselves from
a wide variety of obligations imposed by Congress under the Commerce Clause. 169
Justice's Blackmun's switch in Garcia could not stanch the rising tide of the
Rehnquist Court's New Federalism. Faced with the Court's repeated intervention on
behalf of states in federalism cases, process federalists like Justice Ginsburg, who drew
inspiration from Justice Blackmun's opinion in Garcia, were forced into the role of
dissenters.
Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Breyer's dissent in the 1995 case United States v.
Lopez,170 which only implicitly invoked the adequacy of the political process as a
safeguard for federalism. It is easy to excuse Justice Breyer's lackluster process
federalism performance. The case was the first loud volley in the New Federalism
revolution; the process federalists, Justice Ginsburg among them, had been ambushed
by the majority's nullification of a piece of Commerce Clause legislation for the first
time in nearly sixty years.' 71 In Lopez Justice Breyer could only manage to advocate
166. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
167. Id. at 845, 852-54.
168. Justice Blackmun expressed this disillusionment in Garcia, stating: "A nonhistorical
standard for selecting immune governmental functions is likely to be just as unworkable as is a
historical standard. The goal of identifying 'uniquely' governmental functions, for example, has
been rejected by the Court in the field of governmental tort liability in part because the notion of
a 'uniquely' governmental function is unmanageable." Garcia, 469 U.S. at 545 (citations
omitted).
169. Id. at 550-53 (citations omitted).
170. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
171. Perhaps the process federalists should not have been caught by surprise. Then-Justice
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for the latitude extended to Congress under the rational basis review that the Court had
long brought to bear in its consideration of Congressional assertions of authority under
the Commerce Clause. "[T]he Constitution requires us to judge the connection between
a regulated activity and interstate commerce, not directly, but at one remove,172
Justice Breyer wrote for the dissenters-including Justice Ginsburg. He went on:
"Courts must give Congress a degree of leeway in determining the existence of a
significant factual connection between the regulated activity and interstate commerce
.... The traditional words 'rational basis' capture this leeway."'
' 73
But worrying about the "legal uncertainty" that would result from the majority's
abandonment of the traditional rational basis review' 74 is not an articulation of the
dissenters' vision of the states in our federalism, a challenge directly put to them by the
Lopez majority. 175 Justice Breyer and the other dissenters seemed satisfied to define the
states in the negative, relying on the implication that the states reside in the space left
to them by the judicially enforced and highly deferential expectation that Congress at
least act rationally when exercising its commerce power. The dissenters concluded that
Congress had acted rationally with respect to the legislation at issue in Lopez,
176
exactly as the Court repeatedly had done over more than half a century of dramatic
consolidation and centralization at the national level, often at the expense of the
states.' 77 Without more, Justice Breyer's Lopez dissent seemed to confirm the notion
Rehnquist clearly signaled his commitment to reviving the National League of Cities "states
rights" doctrine in a brief dissenting opinion in the Garcia case. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("I do not think it incumbent on those of us in dissent to spell out
further the fine points of a principle that will, I am confident, in time again command the
support of a majority of this Court."). Just months before the Court ruled in Lopez, Chief Justice
Rehnquist outlined his New Federalism strategy in a speech at Wake Forest University School
of Law. William H. Rehnquist, Convocation Address, Wake Forest University, 29 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 999, 1005-06 (1994) ("It remains for those of us who strongly believe in federalism-
that the historic division between the proper business of the state courts and the proper business
of the federal courts should be respected unless there is good reason to do otherwise-to work
hard to see that the state courts do the best possible job of enforcing the laws presently on the
books.").
172. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 616 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 616-17.
174. Id. at 630.
175. Id. at 566 (majority opinion); see id. at 600 (Thomas, J., concurring).
176. Justice Breyer explained his conclusion that Congress had acted rationally in
criminalizing gun possession near schools by explaining that "[h]aving found that guns in
schools significantly undermine the quality of education .... Congress could also have found,
given the effect of education upon interstate and foreign commerce, that gun-related violence in
and around schools is a commercial, as well as a human, problem." Id. at 620 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). This assessment relies on the "three basic principles of Commerce Clause
interpretation," the principles that the majority's opinion called into question: Congress'
commerce power permits it to regulate local activities that significantly affect interstate
commerce; a significant effect can be revealed in the accumulation or aggregation of individual
acts; and the courts should judge the connection between legislation and interstate commerce "at
one remove" and with considerable deference to Congress. Id. at 615-18.
177. There are several dramatic examples of the Court's erosion of state policy-making
authority in the latter part of the twentieth century. The best known must surely be the Court's
articulation and enforcement of a national standard for racial equality based on the explicit
limitation of state authority found in the Fourteenth Amendment. This led to the end of the
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that process federalism, and the rational basis review at its heart, were nothing more
than cover for a deeper agenda aligned with the Democrat's desire to nationalize
American power.
Two years later Justice Ginsburg joined a somewhat more sound process federalism
dissent, this time authored by Justice Stevens in Printz v. United States. 178 Justice
Stevens charted his course with reference to the lodestar majority opinion in Garcia.
Stevens quoted Justice Blackmun's Garcia opinion when he concluded that "[T]he
principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal
system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself."1 79 With Justice Ginsburg
at his side, Justice Stevens then more fully developed process federalism's vision of the
states as both intersubjective and possessing significant governing autonomy:
Given the fact that the Members of Congress are elected by the people of the
several States, with each State receiving an equivalent number of Senators in order
to ensure that even the smallest States have a powerful voice in the Legislature, it
is quite unrealistic to assume that they will ignore the sovereignty concerns of their
constituents. It is far more reasonable to presume that their decisions to impose
modest burdens on state officials from time to time reflect a considered judgment
that the people in each of the States will benefit therefrom. 8
This is a more affirmative vision of the states in the federal scheme than Justice
Breyer managed in Lopez. States are autonomous centers of regulatory authority
responding to the concerns of their constituents, in part by advancing their interests
through their intersubjective role in the processes of federal governance. In this
states' Jim Crow policies, including segregated public schools. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954). In the 1960s, the Court began to define the Fourteenth Amendment's
individual-liberty guarantees (which protect individuals against the states) in line with the terms
and scope of liberty protections applicable against the federal government pursuant to the Bill of
Rights. This process, known as incorporation, led to a revolution, inter alia, in the rights of those
suspected or accused of crimes-and a concomitant loss of state authority over the field of
criminal procedure. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The Supreme
Court's expansion of the limitations on governing autonomy based on the constitution's
negative liberty or equality protections now apply with equal force against the federal and state
governments (the Court's consideration of the incorporation of the Second Amendement in the
October 2009 term would close the process of incorporating the Bill of Rights as a limit on the
authority of the states). See Nat'l Rifle Ass'n v. City of Chi., 567 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 2009), cert.
granted, 130 S. Ct. 48 (2009).
Over the last half century the Supreme Court also has permissively interpreted Congress's
commerce clause authority at the expense of the states' fundamental governing competence and
to the benefit of national policy making. See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,
Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689
(1948); Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90 (1946); United States v. Se. Underwriters
Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); see also
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, § 3.3, at 259-69; infra Part II.B.2.
178. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
179. Id. at 956 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985)) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
180. Id. at 956.
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account, the states are more than the mere negative implication of a deferential
standard of review. They are autonomous actors in an intersubjective process through
which they pursue their identifiable interests with and against other states and the
federal government.
Justice Stevens's Printz dissent went a step further, noting that the majority had
failed to show that political safeguards had not been adequate to the task of
guaranteeing state autonomy. He offered proof to the contrary:
Recent developments demonstrate that the political safeguards protecting Our
Federalism are effective. The majority expresses special concern that were its rule
not adopted the Federal Government would be able to avail itself of the services of
state government officials "at no cost to itself." But this specific problem of federal
actions that have the effect of imposing so-called "unfunded mandates" on the
States has been identified and meaningfully addressed by Congress in recent
legislation.18 1
Recalling the centrality ofjudicial review to the federalism debate, Justice Stevens
concluded that the Unfimded Mandates Reform Act to which he referred "demonstrates
that unelected judges are better off leaving the protection of federalism to the political
process in all but the most extraordinary circumstances.' '182 Significantly-for the
purposes of my thesis regarding President Clinton's and Justice Ginsburg's shared
centrism regarding federalism--I have already explained that the UMRA counts
strongly in favor of Clinton's pro-state stance.1
8 3
By 2000, when a majority of the Court again overturned Commerce Clause
legislation in United States v. Morrison,184 the unrelenting onslaught of the Chief
Justice's New Federalism had raised the stakes for the process federalists necessitating,
finally, a comprehensive statement of their position. Justice Ginsburg joined Justice
Souter's dissent, which begins with a reassertion of the adequacy of the traditional
rational basis deference exercised by the Court.185 The "fact of... a substantial effect"
on interstate commerce as the basis for a Congressional exercise of Commerce Clause
authority, Souter explained, "is not an issue for the courts in the first instance, but for
the Congress, whose institutional capacity for gathering evidence and taking testimony
far exceeds [the Court's].' 86 Demonstrating the remarkable breadth of the rational
basis review favored by the process federalists, Souter concluded that Congress'
enactment of the legislation was proof enough of its conviction that "facts support its
exercise of the commerce power."'187 Justice Souter cautioned that greater scrutiny of
Congressional Commerce Clause legislation, like that which the Morrison majority
exercised to mark out state and federal spheres of action enforceable by the Court, is
"dependent upon a uniquely judicial competence" for which there is no originalist or
181. Id. at 957 (citations omitted).
182. Id. at 958-59.
183. See supra Part II.A.3.b.
184. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
185. Id. at 628 (Souter, J., dissenting).
186. Id. (citation omitted).
187. Id.
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textual support.188 The majority's assertion of judicial authority to protect the states,
Justice Souter explained, was a rejection of the "Founders' considered judgment that
politics, not judicial review, should mediate between state and national interests."' 8 9
Justice Souter's defense of this originalist claim is thorough, accounting for the views
of James Madison, James Wilson, and John Marshall, as expressed in The Federalist
Papers, commentary on the convention debates, and seminal founding-era decisions of
the Supreme Court. 190 These sources, Souter explained, establish the "importance of
national politics in protecting the States' interests."191 Justice Souter also was satisfied
that the text of the "Constitution remits [the states' sovereign interests] to politics."' 192
Souter explained that the Tenth Amendment cannot be the basis for judicially enforced
state autonomy because it was "formulated... without any provision comparable to
the specific guarantees proposed for individual liberties."' 193 Furthermore, while
conceding that the Seventeenth Amendment diminished the states' political leverage in
the Senate, Justice Souter noted that the direct election of senators and its attending
impact on the states' ability to promote their interests via the federal political process
was now a command of the constitution's text that the Court was bound to honor. 194
"[T]he Amendment," Souter explained, "did not convert the judiciary into an alternate
shield against the commerce power."'
95
Justice Souter's dissent concludes with a clear illustration of process federalism's
intersubjective and autonomous vision of the states. Far from the negation of state
autonomy feared by the dual-sovereignty advocates in the Morrison majority,' 96 Souter
tells a story of assertive and capable state action, pursued by state institutions and
actors, in the process leading to the enactment of the federal legislation at issue. "The
National Association of Attorneys General supported the Act unanimously," he
explained. 197 He noted that a vast majority of individual state Attorneys General urged
Congress to enact the legislation, and that the legislation was responsive to and had
taken account of the reports of state task forces.198 Process federalism, in this view, is
not the disregard of the states that may be evident in the Democratic Party's nationalist
tendencies. Instead, it permits the actualization of state autonomy, first through the
respect shown to the institutions and actors of state government-like the Attorneys
General to which Stevens referred-and second through the respect shown for their
often very successful intersubjective pursuit of states' interests in the processes of
federal government. Thus, Justice Souter, with Justice Ginsburg in agreement, could
remark that the Morrison majority struck the Commerce Clause legislation in the name
of state autonomy in spite of the fact that the "collective opinion of state officials [was]
188. Id. at 638.
189. Id. at 647.
190. Id. at 647-48.
191. Id. at 648.
192. Id. at 649.
193. Id. at 648.
194. Id. at 651-52.
195. Id. at 652.
196. Id. at 615 (majority opinion).
197. Id at 653 (Souter, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 654.
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that the Act was needed."' 99 This led Justice Souter to point out the irony that the states
would be forced to "enjoy the new federalism whether they want it or not.''200
Ernest Young has defended the legitimate federalist potential of the process
federalism embraced by Justice Ginsburg and the other dissenters in Lopez, Printz, and
Morrison.20 1 He very strongly advocates process federalism's intersubjective and
autonomous vision of the states, but Young is less sanguine about the limited function
process federalism assigns to judicial review.
With respect to process federalism's intersubjective vision of the states, Young
largely refines points raised by Wechlser and reconsidered by generations of scholars
since. 202 Thus, Young notes that Wechsler and Choper, like Madison before them,
"emphasized the institutional role of the states in selecting and participating in the
national government., 20 3 Young explained that the states are represented in Congress,
participate in the election of the President, and extensively cooperate in the
administration of federal programs.204 As evidence of the states' intersubjective
capacity, Young considered their role in fashioning electoral districts.205 Echoing
Justice Stevens' Printz dissent, and again underscoring the nexus I see between
President Clinton's and Ginsburg's centrist federalism, Young also notes the states'
206success in enacting the 1995 Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. The intersubjective
character of the states in process federalism, Young explains, requires that federal
decisions are "made through channels" where the states are, in fact, represented, and
that the states must receive notice of the impending federal decision.20 7 Ultimately, as
regards the intersubjective facet of process federalism's vision of the states, Young
concludes that "[p]rocess federalism's central insight is that the federal-state balance is
affected not simply by what federal law is made, but by how that law is made., 208
Young also illuminates process federalism's autonomy component, contrasting it
with New Federalism's preoccupation with "a rather narrow version of state
,sovereignty. ' ' 209 Young explains that Justice Ginsburg and the New Federalism
dissenters favor state autonomy, which "emphasizes the positive use of governmental
authority .... The [Oxford English Dictionary] defines 'autonomy' as '[t]he right of
self-government, of making [a state's] own laws and administering its own affairs."'210
Young argues that the process federalists' concern for state autonomy recognizes that
there would be no reason to care about state governments, no matter how sovereign, "if
those governments have nothing to do., 21' On these terms, process federalism
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 50; Young, supra note 59.
202. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-6-Vis the States: The
Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977); Kramer, supra note 154.
203. Young, supra note 59, at 1355.
204. Id.
205. Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 50, at 67-68.
206. Young, supra note 59, at 1358.
207. Id. at 1358-59.
208. Id. at 1364 (emphasis in original).
209. Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 50, at 3.
210. Id. at 14 (quoting 1 THE OXFoRD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 575 (2d ed. 1989)).
211. Id. at 63.
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expresses an affirmative vision of the states by stressing the states' capacity for self-
government and not merely the negative definition resulting from a demand for state
sovereign immunity from federal norms.21 2 Young argues that process federalism's
concern for state autonomy, as opposed to mere sovereignty, is dramatically supportive
of an affirmative vision of the sates in our federal system. All the "values associated
with federalism," Young explains, "share a common characteristic: They are predicated
on active state governments with important responsibilities." 213 On this point, Young
concludes:
[A]utonomy bears a closer relation than sovereignty to virtually all of the values
that undergird our commitment to federalism. State experimentation, policy
diversity, popular participation, and checks on central power all depend, to a large
extent, on the states having meaningful governmental responsibilities. A state
government that was perfectly sovereign-that is, perfectly unaccountable for its
violations of federal norms-would nonetheless have little meaning unless it also
had the authority and capacity to enact its own policies in response to the demands
of its citizens.21
4
Young takes exception, however, with process federalism's general rejection of
judicial review as a mechanism for protecting and promoting federalism.2"5 He would
not go so far as to forswear any role for the judiciary in resolving federalism
questions. 2 16 Young complains that, by staking such an "all or nothing ' 217 position, the
process federalists have contributed to a bankrupt debate over the judicial review of
federalism, which "has generally been over whether we should have any judicial
review or none at all; between total reliance on the political process to protect
federalism or anything short of that. 2 1 8 Young makes a considerable effort to salvage
process federalism from this "red herring."'219 Judicial review should not be abandoned
altogether, in Young's perspective, but reserved for protecting and maintaining the
political process itself. Citing John Hart Ely's work, Young explains that we should
"count on the political process to resolve most substantive disputes about governmental
policy, [and that we should] rely on courts to enforce the basic rules of that process."
220
Young argues that "[m]ore aggressive judicial review, on this account, is justified only
by some defect in the political process that undermines the ordinary rule of
deference., 221 Judicial review of federalism, to Young's mind, must be available to
ensure that the states as subjects, through their autonomous governing institutions, are
able to fairly compete with the federal government for the popular loyalty of their
212. Id. at 4.
213. Id. at 63 (emphasis omitted).
214. Id. at 163.
215. See Young, supra note 59, at 1350-51.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1367.
218. Id. at 1350 (emphasis in original).
219. Id. at 1386-90.
220. Id. at 1358 (citing JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: ATHEORYOFJUDICIAL
REvIEw 73 (1980)).
221. Id. at 1364.
[Vol. 85:225
CLINTON, GINSBERG, AND CENTRIST FEDERALISM
citizens. 222 This limited role for judicial review acknowledges that "the political and
procedural safeguards of federalism have eroded over time[,] ... [and that c]ourts have
a role in compensating for the erosion, [a role that recognizes that] they have generally
been better at intervening on process grounds than at defining substantive limits on
Congress's powers." 223 Thus, within the parameters of process federalism, which is
characterized by considerable skepticism ofjudicial review, Young nonetheless accepts
"an orientation for judicial review-to correct malfunctions of the political and
institutional checks ... but also a technique of construing doctrines to enhance those
political and institutional checks. 224
Contrary to the suggestion that the New Federalism dissenters desired a total
abandonment ofjudicial review in federalism cases, the Lopez, Printz, and Morrison
dissenters express a sentiment closer to that described by Young.
3. Ginsburg's Other Federalism Dissents
Alongside the "process federalism" dissents she joined in the New Federalism
cases, Justice Ginsburg has authored a number of her own federalism dissents. These
opinions also portray the states as intersubjective and autonomous centers of governing
authority. In some instances, Justice Ginsburg pays more attention to state autonomy,
particularly by insisting that state governing institutions and actors be shown due
respect. Less frequently, she accentuates the states' intersubjectivity that was so much
the focus of Wechsler. Many of the opinions combine these elements to form her
affirmative vision of the states. Process federalism's skepticism for judicial review is
evident throughout the opinions. The following survey of Justice Ginsburg's federalism
dissents does not purport to be comprehensive or systematic. Rather, the survey
consists of a selection of Justice Ginsburg's federalism dissents outside the preemption
doctrine area (to which I turn in a following subpart) that are, to my mind, particularly
suggestive of a body of work that must be characterized as strongly supportive of state
autonomy.
In her dissent in BMW ofNorth America, Inc. v. Gore,225 Justice Ginsburg worried
that the majority's opinion threatened to overwhelm the states' governing autonomy.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, the architect of the Court's New Federalism revolution, joined
Justice Ginsburg on this occasion. In rejecting the majority's conclusion that a two
million dollar punitive damage award upheld by the Alabama courts was so grossly
excessive as to constitute a due process violation, Justice Ginsburg protested that "[t]he
Court... unnecessarily and unwisely venture[d] into territory traditionally within the
States' domain, and d[id] so in the face of reform measures recently adopted or
currently under consideration in legislative arenas. 226 Justice Ginsburg was concerned
with the states' governing autonomy in its own right. The majority's decision, she
argued, demonstrated the Court's "readiness to superintend" the states' regulatory
concerns and promised to embroil the Court in an inappropriate reexamination of state
222. Id. at 1373.
223. Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 50, at 123.
224. Id. at 19.
225. 517 U.S. 559, 607 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 607.
2010]
INDIANA LAWJOURNAL
court and state legislative actions.227 The Court's intrusion upon what Ernest Young
called the states' "positive use of governmental authority" showed disregard for forty-
one state punitive damages reform measures from across the country; statutes that
Justice Ginsburg catalogued in an appendix to her dissent.228 The states' governing
autonomy was also at stake in Justice Ginsburg's complaint that the majority's opinion
did not give due respect to the relevant state-level governing institution through which
Alabama aimed to pursue its "own policies in response to the demands of its
citizens. ' '22 9 In this case, introducing a theme that repeats itself in her federalism
jurisprudence, Justice Ginsburg objected to the majority's failure to show deference to
the state judiciary. She noted that "[t]he Alabama Supreme Court ... endeavored to
follow this Court's prior instructions,, 230 the Court "provided [a] clear statement of the
State's law,"231 and it "'thoroughly and painstakingly' reviewed the jury's award•...
according to principles set out in its own pathmarking decisions and in this Court's
opinions. ' 232 The Alabama Supreme Court's earnest expression of the state's
governing autonomy, Justice Ginsburg concluded, merited the Court's respect.
233
Justice Ginsburg also objected that the states' governing autonomy and
intersubjectivity were threatened by the majority's "watershed decision" in City of
Chicago v. International College of Surgeons. She raised several criticisms of the
majority's recognition of cross-system appeals, pursuant to which federal courts gain
exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings containing, in part, state law claims that seek
review of purely state or local administrative actions. Showing concern for the
regulatory integrity of the states, Justice Ginsburg concluded that the cross-system
appeals would empower the federal court to "directly superintend local agencies by
,,235
affirming, reversing, or modifying their administrative rulings. Justice Ginsburg
argued that this constituted a "startling... reallocation of power" to the advantage of
the federal government.236 On this point, Justice Ginsburg noted that the majority
opinion directly supplanted a state statute that aimed to make the state courts the locus
of review of state and local agency decisions. 237 At stake, Justice Ginsburg noted, were
the vital interests "States have in developing and elaborating state administrative law
... [that] regulates the citizen's contact with state and local government at every
turn. '238 Justice Ginsburg also worried that the majority's expansion of federal court
jurisdiction would harm the states' governing autonomy by showing disrespect for state
227. Id. at 613-14 (noting in the Appendix that state legislatures have enacted several
measures to curtail punitive damage awards).
228. Id. at 614; Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 50, at 14.
229. Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 50, at 163; see BMW, 517 U.S. at 613-14
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
230. BMW, 517 U.S. at 607 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 609.
232. Id. at 610 (quoting BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 629 (Ala. 1994), rev'd,
517 U.S. 559 (1995)).
233. Id. at 607.
234. 522 U.S. 156, 175 (1997) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 177.
237. Id. at 184.
238. Id. at 185.
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courts, which, like state legislatures, are agents of the states' governing autonomy. 2
39
Justice Ginsburg concluded that this disrespect "jeopardizes the 'strong interest' courts
of the State have in controlling the actions of local as well as state agencies," 240 and
threatens an "erosion of state-court authority." 241 Justice Ginsburg also expressed alarm
at the disregard the majority's opinion showed for the states' intersubjective
participation in the federal law-making process. Justice Ginsburg explained that the
majority should have respected the federal jurisdictional statute's failure to explicitly
provide for cross-system appeals. 242 A resolution of the question of the propriety of
cross-system appeals "should stem from the National Legislature's considered and
explicit decision," 243 Justice Ginsburg argued-a process in which the states play a
distinct, intersubjective role.
In Miller v. Johnson,244 a case dominated by equal protection concerns, Justice
Ginsburg took pains in her dissent to object to the federalism implications of the
majority's rejection of Georgia's majority-minority electoral districting scheme. Justice
Ginsburg explained that she and the majority were not divided on the point that
"federalism... weigh[s] heavily against judicial intervention" in the case.245 For her,
however, the weight of federalism would have precluded the Court's intervention.
Ginsburg's dissent chiefly raises concerns about state governing autonomy, at least as
far as state legislatures' districting decisions are expressive of the states' regulatory
will. To this end, Justice Ginsburg again invoked the image of the states' legislative
"domain," 246 and she rebuked the majority with the reminder that on many occasions
the Court had said that reapportionment, like that at issue in Miller, "is primarily the
duty and responsibility of the State through its legislature. ' 247 Justice Ginsburg portrays
state legislatures as "arenas of compromise and electoral accountability, [that] are best
positioned to mediate competing claims." 248 This conception is similar to the
regulatory agents that Ernest Young was interested in when he characterized autonomy
as a defining component of federalism. Thus, the federalism facet of Miller amounted
to a question of the degree of respect owed to states' autonomous governing
competence. Justice Ginsburg's federalism jurisprudence strongly favors the states. She
concluded, "the State chose to adopt the [districting] plan here in controversy-a plan
the state forcefully defends before us. We should respect Georgia's choice . ,249
Justice Ginsburg conceded only a very limited departure from the priority the Court
should show the states in this regard. She would require federal court intervention in
this state legislative prerogative in those cases "when [it is] necessary to secure to
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 186.
242. Id. at 176.
243. Id.
244. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
245. Id. at 934-35 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 936 (quoting Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975)).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 943-44.
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members of racial minorities equal voting fights-fights denied in many states,
including Georgia, until not long ago. 250
Justice Ginsburg returned to the theme of the respect owed to state courts as
institutions and agents of the states' governing autonomy in her dissent in Arizona v.
Evans.25' The majority held that, pursuant to Michigan v. Long,252 the Supreme Court
was entitled to presume that federal law formed the basis of a state-court decision in
order to overcome "the adequate and independent state ground[s]" barrier to its
exercise of appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions when the adequacy and
independence of the state court decision is not clear on the face of the opinion.
3
Justice Ginsburg objected to the application of the Long presumption on federalist
grounds, underscoring the threat the majority's opinion posed to state autonomy. "The
Long presumption," she said, "impedes the States' ability to serve as laboratories for
testing solutions to novel legal problems." 254 Justice Ginsburg cited Brandeis's dissent
in New State Ice Co. v. Liebman,2 55 when insisting that the states' regulatory autonomy
should be fostered so that they are encouraged to "explore different means to secure
respect for individual rights in modem times., 256 As noted earlier, this also was one of
President Clinton's favorite federalism images. 257 Justice Ginsburg regretted the
Court's intrusion into "areas traditionally regulated by the States, '258 and noted that the
opposite presumption (that state courts decide cases on the basis of state law) would
"stop this Court from asserting authority in matters belonging, or at least appropriately
left, to the States' domain."
259
Justice Ginsburg wrote to advance the interests of states nowhere more poignantly
than in her impassioned dissent in Bush v. Gore.260 In the case that saw the Supreme
Court intervene in the ongoing Florida recount of the 2000 presidential election,
Justice Ginsburg reiterated her commitment to state autonomy by again lamenting the
majority's failure to respect a state supreme court's resolution of the case. 261 The lack
of deference the Court showed to the state's judicial authority was compounded in the
case because the Supreme Court faulted the state court for its interpretation of state
law. "I would have thought," Justice Ginsburg wrote, "the 'cautious approach' we
counsel when federal courts address matters of state law, and our commitment to
250. Id. at 936.
251. 514 U.S. 1, 24 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
252. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). Harry Witte identified Michigan v. Long as raising exceptionally
important federalism questions. Witte, supra note 147, at 592-94 ("The presumption of
jurisdiction demonstrates the Rehnquist Court's antipathy both to state court analysis of federal
constitutional rights and to state court analysis of state constitutional rights that produce greater
protection than the Court itself deems appropriate." (emphasis in original)).
253. Evans, 514 U.S. at 7.
254. Id. at 24 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see Ray, supra note 37, at 659.
255. 285 U.S. 262, 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
256. Evans, 514 U.S. at 30 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
257. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
258. Evans, 514 U.S. at 30 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
259. Id. at 33.
260. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
261. See id. at 135-44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Russell A. Miller, Lords of
Democracy: The Judicialization of "Pure Politics" in the United States and Germany, 61
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 587, 618-19 (2004).
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'build[ing] cooperative judicial federalism,' demanded greater restraint. '262 She
described this federal restraint as an ordinary principle at the core of federalism: "two
political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the
other." 263 And then, in a stirring manifesto for state autonomy, Justice Ginsburg
chastised Chief Justice Rehnquist and the New Federalism majority, which ironically
formed the distinctly nationalist majority in Bush v. Gore, for neglecting their well-
known commitment to state autonomy: "Were the other Members of this Court as
mindful as they generally are of our system of dual sovereignty, they would affirmn the
judgment of the Florida Supreme Court. ',264
4. Conclusion
The foregoing defense of the pro-state character of the dissents Justice Ginsburg
joined in the New Federalism cases, and the sampling of dissents she has written in
other federalism cases, reveal Justice Ginsburg's very strong concern for the states'
intersubjective role in our national governance and their governing autonomy. These
were precisely the elements that characterized President Clinton's federalism policy.
As to the states' intersubjectivity, Justice Ginsburg repeatedly insists that the
institutions and the actors that are the agents of the states' regulatory authority are
owed great respect. This is especially true of the state courts. As to the states'
governing autonomy, Justice Ginsburg has repeatedly taken the extraordinary measure
of writing separate dissenting opinions in order to assert her concern for the states'
consequential regulatory "domain."
265
C. Preemption Doctrine
1. Introduction
It is with respect to the preemption doctrine that the nexus between President
Clinton's and Justice Ginsburg's centrist federalism comes most clearly into focus.
After a brief introduction to the field, I consider President Clinton's stumbling second-
term engagement with the preemption doctrine followed by an examination of a final
set of Justice Ginsburg's dissents, this time in the preemption-doctrine context. The
first of these dissents dramatically reveals Ginsburg and President Clinton to be
engaged in the shared articulation of a centrist federalism.
2. Preemption Doctrine and Federalism
In interpreting the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitution, 266 the
Supreme Court has held that federal laws and regulations displace or "preempt" state
law under three broadly construed sets of circumstances:
262. Bush, 531 U.S. at 139 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416
U.S. 386, 391 (1974) (citations omitted)).
263. Id. at 142 (quoting Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 504, n.17 (1999)).
264. Id. at 142-43.
265. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 935 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
266. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
2010]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
(1) "express preemption," where Congress [or the federal agency to which rule-
making authority has been delegated] has in so many words declared its intention
to preclude state regulation of a described sort in a given area; (2) "implied
preemption," where Congress [or the federal agency], through the structure or
objectives of its enactments, has by implication precluded a certain kind of state
regulation in the area; and (3) "conflict preemption," where Congress did not
necessarily focus on preemption of state regulation at all, but where the particular
state law conflicts directly with federal law, or otherwise stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment of federal statutory objectives.267
While this preemption doctrine has a long and distinguished pedigree in American
constitutional law,268 the threat it posed to state autonomy became more pronounced
with the rollout of the New Deal and accompanying expansion of the federal
government's regulatory authority. 269 Concerned for the federalism balance, the
Supreme Court clearly articulated a "presumption against preemption" with respect to
matters traditionally under the authority of state governments. 270 Michael Greve
described the rule in these terms: "federal law should be read to displace traditional
state powers only if the statute says so on its face, or else indicates a 'clear and
unmistakable' congressional intent to preempt the states." 271' Thus, where Congress
expressly provides for the preemption, application of the preemption doctrine is a
relatively straightforward proposition.272 But the Supreme Court has often ignored the
267. 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1176-77 (3rd ed. 2000).
268. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) (finding that a state statute was
superceded regardless of whether its purpose was to supplement federal law to reach areas that
the federal law was presumed not to reach); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (holding
that the power to register aliens is not a concurrent power of the states and of the federal
government).
In Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief Justice Marshall stressed the statutory hierarchy
of the federal system. He observed that, as "to such acts of the State Legislatures
as do not transcend their powers, but.. . interfere with, or are contrary to the law
of Congress, made in pursuance of the constitution,. . . [i]n every such case, the
act of Congress ... is supreme; and the law of the State, though enacted in
exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it."
1 TRIBE, supra, note 267 at 1173 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1,209 (1824)).
269. Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REv.
967, 973 (2002) ("True preemption doctrine, then, was in its infancy until the unprecedented
legislative activity of the post-Depression era.").
270. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Davis, supra note 269,
at 967. See generally Susan Raeker-Jordan, The Pre-emption Presumption That Never Was:
Pre-Emption Doctrine Swallows the Rule, 40 ARtz. L. REv. 1379 (1998) (concluding after an
analysis of Supreme Court preemption doctrine decisions that a bright-line preemption rule
should prevail whereby, absent unambiguous preemptive language, courts should not find that
Congress intended federal law to displace state law).
271. Greve, supra note 147, at 112 (quoting Santa Fe Elevator, 331 U.S. at 230).
272. See KATHLEEN M. SuLLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTTUIoNAL LAW 324 (15th ed.
2004) ("When a valid federal statute explicitly bars certain types of state action, there are no
difficulties."). Mary J. Davis characterized the recent history of the Court's struggle with
express preemption in these terms.
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presumption 273 and has, in fact, suggested a number of factors that can be considered
on a case-by-case basis for determining whether Congress impliedly intended to
preempt state law.274
The preemption doctrine, operating without a rigorously enforced presumption in
favor of state autonomy, has obvious negative ramifications for the states. It gives
ominous force to the constitutional requirement that "any state law, however clearly
within a State's acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal
law, must yield. 275 Quoting Justice O'Connor, James Staab has noted that "the
In the early 1980s, the Court begins in earnest its struggle with the proper analysis
of express preemption provisions, beginning with the preemption provision of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which has a very specific
express preemption provision. The Court will struggle with ERISA preemption
over the next decades as it continues its struggle with preemption doctrine
generally.
Davis, supra note 269, at 990. She continued:
The Court's struggle with express preemption and its meaningful search for
congressional intent based on Congress's express language was soon to be
resolved. One year later [after the Court's ruling in Norfolk & Southern Railway
Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344 (1999)], the Court had an opportunity to clarify its
express preemption analysis and the interpretive methods to be used under that
anaylsis [in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000)]....
Geier represents a seismic shift in the Court's preemption doctrine. The Court
has returned preemption doctrine to its early focus on federal exclusivity and
turned away from any meaningful attempt at discerning congressional intent that
has been "the ultimate touchstone" of preemption analysis since the 1940s.
Preemption analysis is now organized not only to prefer federal law, but to
presume its operation to the exclusion of state law that has even a minimal effect
on the accomplishment of federal objectives.
Id. at 1005-06, 1012-13.
273. Greve, supra note 147, at 112. "Historically, the Supreme Court has said.., that...
there is a presumption against preemption. There is no such presumption any longer, if, indeed,
there ever really was one." Davis, supra note 269, at 968; see Calvin Massey, "Joltin 'Joe Has
Left and Gone Away ": The Vanishing Presumption Against Preemption, 66 ALB. L. REv. 759
(2002) (describing the presumption as animating merely a "ceremonial federalism").
274. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 272, at 324 ("The Court's preemption rulings often
turn on a determination of congressional intent in the setting of the particular text, history and
purposes of the federal legislation involved."). The factors the Court has considered include:
whether the subject of the state law requires national uniformity (preemption is likely); whether
the federal law is pervasive in the field (preemption is likely); whether administration of the
federal and state laws would lead to a conflict (preemption is likely); whether the subject area is
one traditionally dominated by state government (there is a presumption against preemption).
See JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 378 (7th ed. 2004)
("Congress' intention may be clear from the pervasiveness of the federal scheme, the need for
uniformity, or the danger of conflict between the enforcement of state laws and the
administration of federal programs, of [sic] the state law 'stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.' But absent persuasive reasons
evidencing Congressional intent favoring preemption, the Court will not presume the invalidity
of state regulations." (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984)) (citations
omitted)).
275. Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663,666 (1962) (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat)
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preemption doctrine gives the federal government 'a decided advantage in [the]
delicate balance' between the states and the federal government." 276 For this reason,
the preemption doctrine has become a "staple of the Court's ongoing work [managing]
*.. the balance of federal and state power in our complex and sophisticated federal
structure of government"2 77 Ernest Young has gone so far as to suggest that the
preemption doctrine plays a more important role in the state-federal balancing than
Chief Justice Rehnquist's New Federalism jurisprudence, which focused on
constitutionally based and judicially enforceable limits on the scope of Congressional
power. 27 Federal displacement of state law, Young argued, strikes at the heart of"state
regulatory prerogatives, 2 79 the very source of states' ability to promote and engender
popular loyalty.
280
3. Clinton and Preemption
In his bid for reelection in 1996, President Clinton could point to an impressive
federalism record, along with other New Democratic achievements, in underscoring the
solid centrism of his Presidency. In his remarks to the National Governors Association
just months after winning reelection, President Clinton burnished the federalist
commitment of his first term, noting:
They said that we couldn't have an activist Federal Government if we were going
to cut the size of it and reduce regulations and give more authority to the States,
but Government is 300,000 people smaller than it was the day I took office. And I
think it's clear that we've got a different kind of partnership [between the federal
government and the states] here.2s'
Not long into his second term, however, President Clinton stumbled through the
worst federalism crisis of his Presidency with an inexplicable venture into the rarefied
field of federal regulatory preemption. The incident contributed to persistent
skepticism about the administration's commitment to centrist policies like its pro-states
stance on federalism. Those doubts shadowed President Clinton's New Democratic
agenda throughout his time in the White House. Significantly, President Clinton
responded swiftly and comprehensively to the incident to correct this federalist
lapse.28 2
1,210-11 (1824)) (citations omitted).
276. James B. Staab, Conservative Activism on the Rehnquist Court: Federal Preemption Is
No Longer a Liberal Issue, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 129, 140 (2003) (quoting Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991)).
277. Jonathan D. Varat, Federalism and Preemption in October Term 1999,28 PEPP. L. REv.
757, 757 (2001).
278. See Young, Just Blowing Smoke, supra note 50, at 40-41; Young, supra note 59, at
1377.
279. Young, supra note 59, at 1380.
280. For further discussions of factors influencing a state's ability to engender its citizens'
loyalty, see id. at 1377.
281. Remarks to the to the National Governors' Association Conference in Las Vegas,
Nevada, 2 Pun. PAPERS 1013, 1013-14 (July 28, 1997).
282. See JANssoN, supra note 60 (discussing the Clinton administration's general antipathy
to federal regulatory preemption).
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The preemptive force of federal law has also been applied to rules issued by federal
agencies.283 As part of his "new federalism" agenda, and conscious of the federalist
implications of preemption, in 1987, President Reagan issued Executive Order
12,612-Federalism.2 84 Executive Order 12,612 established a catalogue of
"fundamental federalism principles" and "[f]ederalism [p]olicymaking [c]riteria" to be
considered and observed by executive departments and agencies in formulating and
implementing policy.28 5 Strongly supportive of state autonomy, Executive Order
12,612 also included a set of"[s]pecial [r]equirements for [p]reemption" that sought to
limit the preemptive effect of federal agencies' interpretation of statutes,286 as well as
the preemptive effect of their own regulations,287 to only those circumstances in which
Congress expressly preempted state law or, by implication, if the state law was in direct
conflict with the federal statute.288 President Reagan's Federalism executive order
remained in force, unaltered under President Bush and through the first six years of the
Clinton presidency.
On May 14, 1998, while traveling in England, President Clinton issued his own
federalism order, Executive Order 13,083-Federalism289-which revoked President
Reagan's Executive Order 12,612. In stark contrast with President Clinton's centrist
federalism policies, Executive Order 13,083 abandoned President Reagan's "[s]pecial
[r]equirements for [p]reemption, 2 9 0 replacing that standard with a considerably softer
mandate for intergovernmental consultation.291 The order stated: "Each agency shall
have an effective process to permit elected officials and other representatives of State
and local governments to provide meaningful and timely input in the development of
regulatory policies that have federalism implications. 292
283. Fid. Fed. Sav.& Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141,153-54(1982) ("[F]ederal
regulations have no less pre-emptive effect than federal statutes.").
284. Exec. Order No. 12,612, 3 C.F.R. 252 (1988).
285. Id. at 254.
286. Id. at 255.
Executive departments and agencies shall construe... a Federal statute to preempt
State law only when the statute contains an express preemption provision or there
is some other firm and palpable evidence compelling the conclusion that the
Congress intended preemption of State law, or when the exercise of State authority
directly conflicts with the exercise of Federal authority under the Federal statute.
Id.
287. Id.
Executive departments and agencies shall construe any authorization in the statute
for the issuance of regulations as authorizing preemption of State law by rule-
making only when the statute expressly authorizes issuance of preemptive
regulations or there is some other firm and palpable evidence compelling the
conclusion that the Congress intended to delegate to the department or agency the
authority to issue regulations preempting State law.
Id.
288. Id. at 254.
289. Exec. Order No. 13,083, 3 C.F.R. 146 (1999).
290. Exec. Order No. 12,612, 3 C.F.R. 252, 254 (1988).
291. See Exec. Order No. 13,083, 3 C.F.R. at 148.
292. Id.
2010]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
The Executive Order otherwise makes no reference to federal regulatory preemption
of state law. Outraged by these and other substantive facets of Executive Order 13,083
that favored the federal government293 and the total lack of consultation on the matter,
a broad bipartisan coalition of Congressional representatives, representatives of state
and local governments, and citizen groups, forcefully attacked the new executive order.
On August 5, 1998, President Clinton responded to the backlash by suspending
Executive Order 13,083.9
Exactly one year later, after extensive and thoroughgoing consultation with
representatives of the Big Seven, President Clinton issued Executive Order 13,132-
Federalism295 -which reinstated and even strengthened the provisions of President
Reagan's Executive Order 12,612. Especially as regards the issue of preemption,
Executive Order 13,132 goes further than President Reagan's Executive Order 12,612,
requiring "clear evidence" 296 and not merely "firm and palpable evidence" 297 of
Congressional intent to preempt before agencies can take actions (statutory
interpretation or rule making) that will displace state law.29s From the perspective of
the states, the episode also had the positive effect of drawing attention to, and thus,
making compliance with Executive Order 13,132 more likely.299 The attention focused
on President Reagan's Executive Order during the debate highlighted the general
disregard it had been shown by all administrations, 300 leading President Clinton to
pursue an assertive campaign for compliance with Executive Order 13,132.3°1
293. Executive Order 13,083 also considerably broadened the "federalism policymaking
criteria" of President Reagan's Order, permitting federal action, inter alia: "when
decentralization increases the costs of government thus imposing additional burdens on the
taxpayer"; "when States would be reluctant to impose necessary regulations because of fears that
regulated business activity will relocate to other States"; "when placing regulatory authority at
the State or local level would undermine regulatory goals because high costs or demands for
specialized expertise will effectively place the regulatory matter beyond the resources of State
authorities"; or "when the matter relates to Federally owned or managed property or natural
resources, trust obligations, or international obligations." Id.
294. Exec. Order No. 13,095, 3 C.F.R. 202 (1999).
295. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206 (2000), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006).
296. Id. at 208; see Lawrence 0. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., The Public Health
Improvement Process in Alaska: Toward a Model Public Health Law, 17 ALASKA L. REv. 77,
92 n.56 (2000) ("The revised order disfavors federal preemptive laws or policies, requires
executive officials to defer to states whenever possible in setting national standards, and features
an enforcement mechanism against implementation of federal executive policies that lack a
federalism 'impact statement."'); see also KENNETH STARR, PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM,
STEPHANIE K. SEYMOUR, WILLIAM C. CLARK, JOHN CRISWELL & JOE SNEED, THE LAW OF
PREEMPTION 40-56 (1991) (arguing that a "clear intent" requirement for preemption would
advance the interests of federalism).
297. Exec. Order No. 12,612, 3 C.F.R. 252, 255 (1988).
298. See National Conference of State Legislatures, Comparison of Executive Order 12612
(Ronald Reagan, 1987) and Executive Order 13132 (William J. Clinton, 1999) (Sept. 1, 1999)
(unpublished document no longer available online, on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
299. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206 (2000), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000).
300. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERALISM: IMPLEMENTATION OF EXECUTIVE
ORDER 12,612 IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS (1999).
301. Memorandum from Jacob J. Lew for Heads of Executive Dep'ts and Agencies and
Indep. Regulatory Agencies, Guidance for Implementing E.O. 13132 (Oct. 28, 1999), http://
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4. Ginsburg and Preemption
Again recalling the significance she attaches to writing separately in dissent, and in
keeping with the earlier focus on her dissenting opinions in the federalism context, it
makes sense to explore Justice Ginsburg's preemption doctrine jurisprudence (and its
implications for her centrist approach to federalism) by way of a few additional
dissenting opinions. These opinions reveal that Justice Ginsburg has staked her
strongest claim to being a centrist on federalism in the preemption doctrine context.
Michael S. Greve counted Justice Ginsburg as one of the Supreme Court's secure
"anti-preemption" votes. 30 2 And, as noted earlier, Ernest Young has argued that
georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/memoranda/m00-02.pdf. Executive Order 13,132-
Federalism-gained renewed importance when, on May 20, 2009, newly elected President
Barack Obama issued a "Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies"
in which he clearly articulated his administration's commitment to American federalism and
directed that "preemption of State law by executive departments and agencies should be
undertaken only with full consideration of the legitimate prerogatives of the States and with a
sufficient legal basis for preemption." President Barack Obama, Memorandum for the Heads of
Executive Departments and Agencies (May 20, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
thepressoffice/Presidential-Memorandum-Regarding-Preemption/; see Jack Park, Executive
Order on Preemption, http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/pubid. 1644/pub-detail.asp.
302. Greve, supra note 147, at 116. While she frequentlyjoins the Court's decisions to block
the preemption of state law, as Ernest Young noted,
[t]he pattern . . . is not uniform. Preemption cases do not display the same
consistent five-to-four voting pattern that characterizes so many of the Court's
federalism cases. And the nationalists have been far from consistent in their
devotion to state regulatory prerogatives.... Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority
opinion in a 1998 case, ElAl IsraelAirlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, opining that
the presumption against preemption does not apply to treaty interpretation.
Young, supra note 59, at 1382-83 (citations omitted). Young suggested that this flexibility is a
consequence of the fact that preemption cases, "while carrying profound implications for the
federal balance, are fundamentally about statutory interpretation." Id. at 1383.
Since joining the Court, Justice Ginsburg has participated in forty-eight preemption cases. In
twenty-four cases Justice Ginsburg has sided with the states. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct.
1187 (2009); Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408 (2008); Riegel v.
Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008); Mid-Con Freight Sys. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545
U.S. 440 (2005); Bates v. Dow Agrosciences L.L.C., 544 U.S. 431 (2005); Nixon v. Mo. Mun.
League, 541 U.S. 125 (2004); Am. Ins. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003); Inyo County v.
Paiute-Shoshone Indians, 538 U.S. 701 (2003); Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538
U.S. 644 (2003); City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., 536 U.S. 424 (2002);
Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529
U.S. 861 (2000); Norfolk S. Ry. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344 (2000); UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am.
v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999); Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299 (1999); Montana v. Crow
Tribe of Indians, 523 U.S. 696 (1998); Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833 (1997); De Buono v.
NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806 (1997); Ca. Div. of Labor Standards
Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. 316 (1997); Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213
(1997); Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
518 U.S. 470 (1996); Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995); American Dredging
Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443 (1994).
In twenty cases Justice Ginsburg has sided with the federal government. See Rowe v. N.H.
Motor Trans. Ass'n, 128 S. Ct. 989 (2008); Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1
(2007); Waguon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005); Aetna Health Inc. v.
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preemption raises federalism issues of great significance for state autonomy because
preemption
threatens, in a way that lawsuits against state governments or minor federal
enactments like the Gun-Free School Zones Act do not, the core regulatory
authority of state governments. And in so doing, preemption undermines the
states' ability to win, through provision of public goods and services, the popular
loyalty necessary to make a system of political safeguards work. Broad preemption
of state regulatory authority thus threatens the self-enforcing nature of the
Framers' original structure. °3
This is unmistakably the view held by Justice Ginsburg, a fact made clear when she
joined Justice Stevens's dissent in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.304 In Geier,
Justice Stevens argued for placing federal preemptive power
squarely in the hands of Congress, which is far more suited than the Judiciary to
strike the appropriate state/federal balance (particularly in areas of traditional state
regulation), and [which is required to] speak clearly when exercising that power.
In this way, the structural safeguards inherent in the normal operation of the
legislative process operate to defend state interests from undue infringement. °5
Justice Stevens's dissent reads like a manifesto for process federalism, leading
Ernest Young to conclude that "[tlhe Geier dissent is probably the fullest statement of
the process federalism case for a presumption against preemption., 30 6 Thus, in Geier
we see that Justice Ginsburg's preemption doctrine jurisprudence is only a subset of
her broader commitment to a process-oriented approach to federalism.
Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004); Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S.
246 (2004); Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004); Hillside Dairy
Inc. v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59 (2003); Entergy La., Inc. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 539 U.S. 39
(2003); Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,
533 U.S. 525 (2001); Egelhoff.v Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiff's
Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001); Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363
(2000); El Al Isr. Airlines v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999); Am. Telephone &
Telegraph Co. v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214 (1998); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v.
Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995);
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995); Am. Airlines v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219
(1995); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 510 U.S. 86 (1993).
In the remaining four cases Justice Ginsburg voted to avoid the preemption doctrine issue.
See Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 978 (2008); Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh,
547 U.S. 677 (2006); California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491 (1998); Rivet v.
Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470 (1998).
303. Young, supra note 59, at 1384; see Davis, supra note 269, at 969 ("On a more basic
level.... preemption is about power and politics because it involves the fundamental balance of
Congress's power in relation to the states .... To the extent that the Supreme Court has
something to say about the power struggle of federalism, it speaks, partially at least, through its
preemption decisions.").
304. 529 U.S. at 907 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
305. Id.
306. Young, supra note 59, at 1382.
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Justice Ginsburg's preemption doctrine dissent in Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v.
Shanklin30 7 firmly establishes her pro-state preemption doctrine stance. It also provides
dramatic evidence of the nexus between President Clinton's and Justice Ginsburg's
centrist vision of federalism. Within days of the issuance of President Clinton's
corrective Executive Order 13,132,308 which formally sought to limit federal regulatory
preemption of state law, the Norfolk Southern Railway Company petitioned the
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, asking for review of the District Court's
$615,379 judgment, which had been upheld on appeal by the Sixth Circuit.3°9 At the
trial court and again on appeal, Norfolk Southern objected to the application of
Tennessee tort law to Dedra Shanklin's diversity wrongful death action.3 0 Shanklin's
husband had been killed when he was struck by a Norfolk Southern train at a railroad
crossing along Oakwood Church Road in Gibson County, Tennessee.31' Contrary to the
rulings of the district court and court of appeals on the issue, Norfolk Southern urged
the Supreme Court to conclude that any state law causes of action that might have
arisen from the accident had been preempted and were foreclosed by the Highway
Safety Act of 1973312 and the attending regulations and orders concerned with safety at
railroad-highway crossings that had been issued by the Secretary of Transportation by
way of the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA). The Supreme Court granted
certiorari review on October 18, 1999.
3 13
President Clinton's Department of Transportation and Attorney General joined the
fray by filing an amicus curiae brief supporting Ms. Shanklin on January 28, 2000.3 14
This required the Clinton administration to argue against the preemptive effect of the
federal railroad crossing safety regulations. 315 It is not noteworthy that the federal
government might view the preemptive force of its regulations differently than a
private litigant (the defendant in the original action, Norfolk Southern), and that the
federal government might intervene before the Supreme Court in order to advocate for
its understanding of its regulations. But the government's opposition to the preemptive
effect of the federal regulations implicated in Shanklin is noteworthy because it serves
as a clear example of President Clinton's New Democratic federalism jurisprudence. In
siding with Ms. Shanklin, President Clinton's administration urged a narrow
characterization of federal preemptory authority to the significant advantage of state
regulatory autonomy.316 Without more, the Clinton administration's position in the case
would be indicative of a concern for state autonomy. Viewed as an attempt to fulfill the
mandate of the freshly minted Executive Order 13,132, it says quite a lot about the
administration's commitment to the states. More tellingly, however, this position
required the Clinton administration to reverse, for the benefit of the states, the
307. 529 U.S. at 360 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
308. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206 (2000), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000).
309. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344 (No. 99-312).
310. Shanklin v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 173 F.3d 386, 388, 389 (6th Cir. 1999).
311. Shanklin, 529 U.S. at 350.
312. 23 U.S.C. § 152 (2006).
313. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 528 U.S. 949, 949 (1999).
314. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Shanklin, 529 U.S.
344 (Jan. 28, 2000) (No. 99-312).
315. See id. at 15-21.
316. Id.
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nationalist position the government had taken before the Supreme Court under the first
President Bush in CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood,317 a case involving the
same federal regulatory regime.
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, held for Norfolk Southern and found, in
keeping with the view of the Court in Easterwood, that the FHWA regulations
preempted Shanklin's Tennessee tort claims.318 With none-too-little incredulity, Justice
O'Connor remarked that the position taken by the majority "is precisely the
interpretation [of the relevant regulations] that the FHWA endorsed in Easterwood...
Thus," Justice O'Connor continued, "Easterwood adopted the FHWA's own
understanding [of the relevant regulation], a regulation that the agency had been
administering for 17 years., 319 How is it, Justice O'Connor wondered, that the
"[r]espondent and the Government now argue that [the relevant regulations] are more
limited in scope,, 320 especially when "[tihis construction . . . contradicts the
regulation's plain text." 321Although the government must have anticipated the
questions a reversal of its position in Easterwood would pose, it only addressed the
matter directly in a footnote in its amicus curiae brief.322 The Court pressed Assistant
Solicitor General Patricia Millet on the matter during oral argument:
Question: In Easterwood, which was what, 7 or 8 years ago, this Court laid
down-wisely or unwisely it laid down a preemption rule, and the preemption rule
turned on the participation of Federal funds, and the formulation that the Court
used, if I remember correctly, was just about exactly what the Solicitor General at
the time said was the formulation we ought to use.
... But the truth is, there has been a simple rule, announced by the Court for 7
or 8 years ago, and I don't know why that does not trump [the government's
current, contrary position].323
317. 507 U.S. 658 (1993).
318. See Shanklin, 529 U.S. at 358-59.
319. Id. at 354-55.
320. Id. at 355.
321. Id. at 356.
322. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra
note 314, at 23 n.29. The footnote stated:
The government's brief in Easterwood was similarly limited to grade-crossing
improvement projects that installed "adequate" devices under 23 C.F.R. §
646.214(b)(3) and (4) .... The brief did not address preemption under the
minimum protection program. Indeed, the brief noted that federal law requiring
"all crossings [to] be equipped, at a minimum with a cross-buck warning signs" is
an "exception" to the general rule that the "Manual does not generally specify
when particular safety devices are required."
Id. (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, at 10,
CSX Trans. Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (Aug. 27 1992) (Nos. 91-790 & 91-1206))
(citations omitted). The brief thus identifies the limits of its preemption argument.
323. Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344 (No. 99-312).
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In its amicus brief, and in Millet's response to the Court's question during oral
argument, the government invoked a technical distinction in the facts of the two
cases.324 The more probable explanation for the government's reversal, however, lies in
the change of presidential administrations between Easterwood and Shanklin, which
made the government's arguments concerning the limits of regulatory preemption in
the case a matter of the Clinton administration's fiat and, thus, reflective of President
Clinton's New Democratic centrism regarding federalism and state autonomy.
Significantly, Justice Ginsburg wrote the lone dissent (joined by Justice Stevens) in
Shanklin.325 Besides lamenting that the majority's holding left Dedra Shanklin with no
avenue for recovery, Justice Ginsburg emphasized the important federalism
implications of the case, especially the impact the majority's decision would have for
the states' governing autonomy.326 The majority's holding, Justice Ginsburg
complained, "preempts all state regulation of safety devices at each individual
crossing" 327 and stops the state of Tennessee "from requiring the installation of
adequate devices at any of the [federally] funded crossings. The upshot of the Court's
decision" 328 to disable the state regulatory interest in the matter on the basis of such a
broad reading of the preemptive force of the federal regulations, Justice Ginsburg
disapprovingly noted, "is that state negligence law is displaced,
329
Justice Ginsburg has shown no sign of softening her pro-state preemption doctrine
stance. In 2008, she was the sole dissenter in Riegel v. Medronic,330 in which the
majority held that the preemption clause of the Medical Device Amendments of 1976
(MDA)331 barred the plaintiffs' state common law causes of action. The MDA
explicitly preempts state requirements concerning an FDA-approved device's safety
and effectiveness that are "different from or in addition to" 332 MDA requirements, and
the eight-justice majority concluded that the relevant state law tort claims constituted
safety and effectiveness requirements because "a liability award 'can be, indeed is
designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy.'
333
But this was precisely the federalism concern that stirred Justice Ginsburg to
dissent. Reiterating the language she often uses to characterize the states' governing
autonomy, Justice Ginsburg complained that preemption of the state common law
claims cuts "deeply into a domain historically occupied by state law."334 She reminds
the majority of what is at stake in preemption cases like Riegel: "the historic police
powers of the States," 335 "the federal-state balance, ' 336 and the special respect owed by
324. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 314,
at 40-42.
325. 529 U.S. at 360 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
326. Id.
327. Id. (emphasis added).
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008).
331. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c-k, 379, 379a (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 3512 (2006).
332. § 360k(a)(1).
333. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1008 (quoting Cipollone v. Ligget Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,552
(1992)).
334. Id. at 1013 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
335. Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
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the federal government to "state action in fields of traditional state regulation 337 or in
fields of traditional state primacy like health and safety.338 Even the MDA's provisions,
Justice Ginsburg argued, extend greater solicitude for state concerns than the
majority's construction allows.339 Justice Ginsburg, alone among the Court's justices,
refused to subscribe to such an enfeebled construction of state governing autonomy in
our federalism.
5. Conclusion
Justice Ginsburg has defended the states' autonomy against a majority of the Court
bent on national aggrandizement through an expanded preemption doctrine. With
Justice Ginsburg at the barricades, the majority has busily held "that ambiguous
[federal] statutes preempt state law without much regard for state prerogatives at
all. 34 Ernest Young concluded, based on this trend, that "the so-called 'states'-rights'
majority [of Rehnquist's New Federalism jurisprudence] may be ignoring and even
doing real damage to the states in the category of cases that matters most."
341
Throughout her preemption dissents, Justice Ginsburg returns again and again to her
chief federalism concern: the states' governing autonomy. Justice Ginsburg's centrist
federalism jurisprudence in the preemption doctrine context intersects with the strongly
pro-state position on which the Clinton administration eventually settled with its
second, corrective Federalism executive order. In Shanklin, Justice Ginsburg and
President Clinton nearly spoke with one voice, arguing against a rising nationalist tide
to insist that due respect be shown to the states' governing autonomy.
CONCLUSION
The Clinton/Ginsburg federalism described in this Article can be fairly called
centrist because it resides somewhere between the contending poles of American
federalism. 342 The Justice and her President do not embrace the dual federalism
advocated by the New Federalism Republicans. 343 But that might have been expected
of them. The greater challenge for those who would casually brand them liberals comes
336. Id. (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).
337. Id. (quoting N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995)).
338. Id.
339. Id. at 1014 n.3.
340. Young, supra note 59, at 1377.
341. Id. at 1351.
342. Philip Weiser described the continuum of American federalism. Philip J. Weiser,
Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1692 (2001). "A critical feature of cooperative federalism statutes is the balance
they strike between complete federal preemption (a preemptive federalism) and uncoordinated
federal and state action in distinct regulatory spheres (a dual federalism)." Id. at 1697.
343. Rotunda argues that the Rehnquist Court's New Federalism does not recall and should
not be "confused with the 'states' rights' slogan that the slave owners adopted in the pre-Civil
War era or that the Dixiecrats adopted in the 1940s and later," Rotunda, supra note 145, at 870,
and the "old Commerce Clause of the pre-1937 Court," id. at 873, which it was argued in the
roll-out of the New Deal had prevented "both state governments and the federal government
from regulating economic and commercial activity," id.
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from the fact that, in their sympathy for the states' governing autonomy and
intersubjectivity, President Clinton and Justice Ginsburg moved to the right of the
nationalism of the Great Society Democrats.
And now, as we begin the work of considering Justice Ginsburg's legacy, we would
do well to remember that, in the shadow of Justice Ginsburg's progressive gender
equality jurisprudence resides an often overlooked centrisrn-particularly with respect
to federalism--that complements President Clinton's attempt to refashion the
Democratic Party as a party "embracing ideas and values that [are] both liberal and
conservative.,, 3 44 For this, former President Clinton and the states are much in her debt.
344. CLINTON, supra note 13, at 366.
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